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ARTICLES
PLEA BARGAINING IN
THE SHADOW OF DEATH
Joseph L. Hoffmann, * Marcy L. Kahn,* & Steven W. Fisher***
INTRODUCTION
On July 20, 2000, a ruling by the Third Department of the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, effectively banned all plea
bargaining in New York capital cases. The ruling, in the case of
People v. Edwards,1  was based on the Third Department's
interpretation of the landmark 1998 New York Court of Appeals
decision in Matter of Hynes v. Tornei.2 Taken together, Edwards and
Hynes have thrown the day-to-day administration of the death penalty
in New York into a state of confusion.'
Edwards and Hynes involved the same set of fundamental
questions: What are the constitutional implications of plea bargaining
in the shadow of death? Can the threat of the death penalty ever be
used as leverage to persuade a defendant to waive his constitutional
right to a jury trial and enter a plea of guilty? If so, when and under
what circumstances?
In an attempt to find answers to these difficult questions, the
Edwards and Hynes courts looked primarily to the United States
* Harry Pratter Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. Professor
Hoffmann would like to thank his Indiana University colleague, Professor Craig
Bradley, for making helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.
** Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District of New York. Justice Kahn
wishes to thank Jonathan Zimet, Associate Counsel (Capital Cases), New York State
Unified Court System Office of Court Administration, for his legal archaeology and
thoughtful comments on the article; Barbara Jaffe, Justice Kahn's Principal Law
Clerk, for her helpful suggestions; Erena Baybik, New York Law School Class of
2001, for her research assistance; and Arlene Goldschlager, Justice Kahn's secretary,
for her assistance in managing logistical aspects of the project.
*** Justice of the Supreme Court, Eleventh Judicial District of New York, and
Administrative Judge of the Supreme Court, Queens County. Justice Fisher would
like to thank his Executive Assistant, Paul Lewis, for his helpful suggestions.
1. 274 A.D.2d 754, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d Dep't 2000).
2. 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1998), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1015 (1999).
3. See John Caher, Defendant Faces Death After Plea Vacated, N.Y. LJ., July 21,
2000, at 1; Daniel Wise, Both Sides Troubled by Plea Bargaining Ban, N.Y. L.J., Sept.
5, 2000, at 1.
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Supreme Court's 1968 decision in United States v. Jackson.4 There,
the Court struck down the death-penalty provision in the Federal
Kidnaping Act,5 because the Act provided that the death penalty
could be imposed only after conviction at a jury trial, but not after
conviction at a bench trial or upon a guilty plea.6 This statutory
sentencing disparity, according to the Jackson Court, "impos[ed] an
impermissible burden"7  on the exercise of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights by defendants who sought a jury trial. The
statute's constitutional flaw was that it "needlessly encourage[d] ''8
defendants to waive their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, even if
many of the resulting guilty pleas were not necessarily coerced under
traditional standards of voluntariness.9 The proper remedy for this
constitutional flaw, according to the Jackson Court, was to excise the
offending death-penalty provision and thus allow the remainder of the
Act-with a reduced maximum punishment of life imprisonment-to
survive.10
In Hynes, the New York Court of Appeals squarely addressed a
Jackson challenge to the New York death-penalty statute." The New
York statute, like the Federal Kidnaping Act, had the effect of
limiting the death penalty to those defendants who were convicted of
the capital crime (in this case, first-degree murder) at a jury trial. The
statute created this effect by prohibiting bench trials for defendants
charged with first-degree murder,12 and by further providing that
defendants could plead guilty to first-degree murder only upon the
prior agreement of the trial judge and prosecutor that the death
penalty would not be imposed. 3
The Hynes court concluded that because the New York statute
failed to provide for the possibility of a death sentence after a guilty
plea, it created exactly the same kind of statutory sentencing disparity
that was held unconstitutional in Jackson.4 In Hynes, however, the
4. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964). In 1994, Congress changed the spelling of kidnaping
in the statute to kidnapping. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. 103-322, tit. XXXIII, § 330021, 108 Stat. 1796, 2150 (1994) (amending
Title 18, United States Code). Although both spellings are correct, see American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 990 (3d ed. 1996), this article will use
the spelling as it appears in the original Act.
6. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570-72.
7. Id. at 583.
8. Id. (emphasis omitted).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 591.
11. Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1 ("An Act to amend the penal law,
the criminal procedure law, the judiciary law, the county law, the correction law and
the executive law, in relation to imposition of the death penalty ...
12. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10(1) (McKinney 1993).
13. Id. §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
14. Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 622-27, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1204-07,
684 N.Y.S.2d 177, 180-83 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
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court chose to remedy the constitutional flaw not by eliminating the
death penalty, but instead by striking the plea provisions from the
death-penalty statute. As a result, "a defendant may not plead guilty
to first degree murder while a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty is pending;"' 5 in other words, once a notice of intent is filed,"
a guilty plea to first-degree murder is permitted only after the
prosecutor withdraws the request for the death penalty. The court
added, however, that defendants remain free to plead guilty to lesser
offenses not punishable by death, such as second-degree murder, even
while they are facing the possibility of a death penalty under a first-
degree murder charge. 7
In Edwards, the Third Department addressed a post-Hynes
situation in which the prosecutor and defendant, in a first-degree
murder case with a pending notice of intent to seek the death penalty,
reached a pretrial agreement through plea negotiations."M Pursuant to
this agreement, the defendant first proffered a guilty plea to first-
degree murder and made a complete allocution. Next, the prosecutor
consented to the plea and withdrew the notice of intent to seek the
death penalty. Finally, the trial judge accepted the defendant's plea
and entered a judgment of conviction.1 9
Although this complicated procedure seemed to meet the letter of
the law set forth in Hynes-because the defendant's plea was not
actually entered until the death notice had been withdrawn-the
Edwards court concluded that "it overlooks the essence of the Hynes-
Jackson infirmity."'2  According to the Edwards court, "[i]f a
prosecutor who has served a death notice is permitted to delay its
withdrawal until after a defendant's plea allocution, then the choice to
plead guilty has been made under compulsion of the death notice and
a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights have been
impermissibly burdened."'" The court held that, under Hynes and
Jackson, "it is constitutionally impermissible for prosecutors to
negotiate guilty pleas to murder in the first degree while a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty is pending."'
15. Id at 629, 706 N.E.2d at 1208-09, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 184-85.
16. There remains an open question whether a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty is considered to be "pending," under Hynes, during the 120-day period within
which the prosecutor may, according to New York law, file such a notice of intent, but
before the prosecutor has elected to do so. See People v. Mower, 719 N.Y.S.2d 780 (3d
Dep't 2001); People v. Owes, No. 2000-0161 (Monroe County Ct. Sept. 27, 2000); see
also infra Part III.G (discussing Owes and Mower).
17. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 629-30, 706 N.E.2d at 1209, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 185 (citing
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,39 (1970)).
18. People v. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d 754,755,712 N.Y.S.2d 71, 74 (3d Dep't 2000).
19. Id
20. Id at 757, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
21. Id
22. Id. at 758, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
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Edwards and Hynes may both appear, at first glance, to be logical
applications of Jackson to the New York death-penalty statute. But
the holding in Edwards-that there can be no plea bargaining in the
shadow of death, at least under the New York statute23-not only
changed the prevailing rule and practice in New York capital cases,
but also runs directly contrary to the virtually universal day-to-day
practice in every other American death-penalty jurisdiction.
Moreover, the holding in Edwards seems inconsistent with several
post-Jackson United States Supreme Court decisions. For example, in
Brady v. United States,24 a defendant who had pleaded guilty to avoid
the death penalty under the Federal Kidnaping Act-the very same
statute that was involved in Jackson-was held to have made a
voluntary and constitutionally valid plea. And in North Carolina v.
Alford,25 a defendant who had pleaded guilty to a lesser, non-capital
offense to avoid the death penalty under a North Carolina murder
statute that was later held unconstitutional under Jackson, but who
had steadfastly maintained his innocence throughout his plea
proceedings, likewise was held to have made a voluntary and
constitutionally valid plea. If, as the Edwards court held, plea
bargaining in the shadow of death is constitutionally impermissible
under Hynes and Jackson, then how can Brady and Alford be
explained?
The problem is that the United States Supreme Court has never
attempted to reconcile its decision in Jackson with Brady, Alford, or
several other post-Jackson decisions -including Parker v. North
Carolina,26 Atkinson v. North Carolina,27 Bordenkircher v. Hayes,"
and Corbitt v. New Jersey9 -that might similarly be interpreted as
having either altered or undermined the constitutional rule
established in Jackson. A complete understanding of Jackson's
contemporary significance thus requires a close examination of these
post-Jackson decisions-some well known but others nearly forgotten,
and all rendered more than two decades ago.
23. Id. at 757-58, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 75. As will be discussed later, the Edwards
decision, relying on the authority of Hynes, appears to leave open a single, small
window of opportunity for plea bargaining where the notice of intent to seek the
death penalty has been filed-namely, the chance that the prosecution and defense
may reach an agreement under which the defendant will plead guilty to the lesser
crime of second-degree murder. See infra note 309 and accompanying text; see also
supra note 16 (noting the open question of whether plea negotiations may take place
within the 120-day period for filing a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, but
before such a notice has been filed).
24. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
25. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
26. 397 U.S. 790 (1970); see infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
27. 403 U.S. 948 (1971); see infra Part I.C.
28. 434 U.S. 357 (1978); see infra Part I.D.
29. 439 U.S. 212 (1978); see infra Part I.E.
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Given the above, it is not at all surprising that the New York courts,
in Edwards and Hynes, struggled to make sense of Jackson and the
United States Supreme Court's post-Jackson decisions. The Court's
rulings in this area generated significant jurisprudential tension in the
late 1960s and 1970s, and since that time, the Court has never been
compelled to resolve the tension-until now, that is. The peculiar
characteristics of the New York death-penalty statute " 1 have exposed
the long-dormant conflicts between Jackson and the post-Jackson
decisions. At this point in time, the New York courts face
considerable difficulty in finding their own workable solution to the
Jackson problem created by the New York statute. As a result, the
recent developments in New York may ultimately force the United
States Supreme Court to revisit Jackson and resolve the
jurisprudential tension that has long lingered in its wake.
In this article, we begin by reviewing Jackson and the United States
Supreme Court's post-Jackson decisions. We chronicle the pertinent
history of the death penalty in New York, as well as the law and
practice of plea bargaining under the current New York death-penalty
statute. We then describe in full detail the relevant New York case
law on plea bargaining in the shadow of death, up to and including the
decisions in Hynes and Edwards. Finally, we analyze the
contemporary significance of Jackson, taking into account the post-
Jackson decisions, in the hope that this analysis might prove helpful to
the New York courts as they continue to grapple with the "Hynes-
Jackson" issue.
I. BACKGROUND- UNITED STATES V. JACKSON
As noted in the introduction, Edwards and Hynes were based
primarily on United States v. Jackson. But the story of Edwards and
Hynes actually began three years before Jackson, in 1965, when the
United States Supreme Court decided Griffin v. California."
Although Griffin did not involve plea bargaining at all, and although
the presence of the death penalty in Griffin was irrelevant to the legal
issues therein, the case nevertheless set the stage for Jackson and,
many years later, Edwards and Hynes.
In Griffin, the defendant in a capital murder case chose not to
testify at his guilt-innocence trial.12 The trial judge instructed the jury
that the defendant had the constitutional right not to testify, but went
on to tell the jury that "if he does not testify... the jury may take that
failure into consideration... as indicating that among the inferences
that may be reasonably drawn [from evidence or facts that the
defendant might be expected to deny or explain] those unfavorable to
30. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
31. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
32- Id at 609.
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the defendant are the more probable."33 In addition, the prosecutor,
at closing, stressed that the defendant-who had been seen in an alley
with the victim on the night of the murder-would have known
certain facts and circumstances about the victim's situation? 4 The
prosecutor strongly suggested to the jury that the defendant's failure
to testify about such facts and circumstances was an indication of his
guilt.3  The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.36
The Supreme Court reversed. In a majority opinion by Justice
Douglas, the Griffin Court held that the trial judge's and prosecutor's
comments on the defendant's silence violated the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court explained that
"comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial
system of criminal justice,' which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is
a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege.
It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.- 37
In Jackson,38 the Court found good reason to apply the Griffin
rationale to certain provisions contained in the Federal Kidnaping
Act. The Act provided:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate.., commerce, any
person who has been unlawfully... kidnaped ... and held for
ransom.., or otherwise... shall be punished (1) by death if the
kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict
of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term
of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.39
In Jackson, the defendant was charged with a kidnaping for ransom
in which the victim was harmed, thus making him eligible for a
possible death sentence. Prior to trial, the defendant argued that the
Act, as quoted above, was unconstitutional under Griffin because it
attached a price to the defendant's assertion of his constitutional right
to a jury trial.4" The trial court accepted this argument and dismissed
the kidnaping charge."
The Supreme Court agreed that the Act unconstitutionally
burdened the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights,
although the Court chose a different remedy than had the trial court.
According to the Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Stewart, "the
33. Id. at 610 (internal quotes omitted).
34. Id. at 610-11.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 611.
37. Id. at 614 (citation and footnote omitted).
38. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964) (emphasis added). The italicized portion of the
statute had been interpreted to limit the death penalty to those cases where a
defendant had been found guilty after a jury trial, and where the jury had then
recommended a death sentence.
40. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571.
41. Id.
2318 [Vol. 69
2001] PLEA BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OFDEATH 2319
defendant's assertion of the right to jury trial may cost him his life, for
the federal statute authorizes the jury-and only the jury-to return a
verdict of death. 42
Under the Federal Kidnaping Act... the defendant who abandons
the right to contest his guilt before a jury is assured that he cannot
be executed; the defendant ingenuous enough to seek a jury
acquittal stands forewarned that, if the jury finds him guilty and does
not wish to spare his life, he will die.43
In the key section of the opinion, the Court concluded that the Act
violated the defendant's constitutional rights in much the same way as
had the trial judge's and prosecutor's comments in Griffin:
Our problem is to decide whether the Constitution permits the
establishment of such a death penalty, applicable only to those
defendants who assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury.
The inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to
discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead
guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to
demand a jury trial. If the provision had no other purpose or effect
than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those
who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently
unconstitutional. But, as the Government notes, limiting the death
penalty to cases where the jury recommends its imposition does
have another objective: It avoids the more drastic alternative of
mandatory capital punishment in every case. In this sense, the
selective death penalty procedure established by the Federal
Kidnaping Act may be viewed as ameliorating the severity of the
more extreme punishment that Congress might have wished to
provide.
The Government suggests that, because the Act thus operates "to
mitigate the severity of punishment," it is irrelevant that it "may
have the incidental effect of inducing defendants not to contest in
full measure." We cannot agree. Whatever might be said of
Congress' objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that
needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights. The
question is not whether the chilling effect is "incidental" rather than
intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and
therefore excessive. In this case the answer to that question is clear.
The Congress can of course mitigate the severity of capital
punishment. The goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which
42. Id. at 572. The Court rejected, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the
Government's claims that, under the Act, (1) a jury's recommendation of death could
lead to imposition of a death sentence only if the trial judge agreed with the jury's
recommendation, and (2) even without a jury trial, as in the case of a plea bargain or
bench trial, the trial judge could still convene a special sentencing jury, and thus the
defendant would still face the possibility of a death sentence. Id. at 572-78. The Court
also declined the Government's invitation to reform the statute to allow for such a
special sentencing jury. Id. at 578-81.
43. Id. at 581.
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a jury recommends it is an entirely legitimate one. But that goal can
be achieved without penalizing those defendants who plead not
guilty and demand jury trial. In some States, for example, the choice
between life imprisonment and capital punishment is left to a jury in
every case-regardless of how the defendant's guilt has been
determined. Given the availability of this and other alternatives, it
is clear that the selective death penalty provision of the Federal
Kidnaping Act cannot be justified by its ostensible purpose.
Whatever the power of Congress to impose a death penalty for
violation of the Federal Kidnaping Act, Congress cannot impose
such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of
a constitutional right. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609.
It is no answer to urge, as does the Government, that federal trial
judges may be relied upon to reject coerced pleas of guilty and
involuntary waivers of jury trial. For the evil in the federal statute is
not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but
simply that it needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be
inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose an
impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right.
Thus the fact that the Federal Kidnaping Act tends to discourage
defendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial
by jury hardly implies that every defendant who enters a guilty plea
to a charge under the Act does so involuntarily.44
In a footnote, at the end of the quoted passage, the Court again
cited Griffin:
So, too, in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, the Court held that
comment on a defendant's failure to testify imposes an
impermissible penalty on the exercise of the right to remain silent at
trial. Yet it obviously does not follow that every defendant who
ever testified at a pre-Griffin trial in a State where the prosecution
could have commented upon his failure to do so is entitled to
automatic release upon the theory that his testimony must be
regarded as compelled.45
In other words, Griffin and Jackson were not necessarily about
coerced testimony or compelled guilty pleas, respectively. Instead,
they were about the fact that the particular practices at issue imposed
a burden-or, to put it differently, set a price-on the defendant's
exercise of his constitutional rights. And, at least in Jackson, the
burden was a needless one, since the same legitimate goal could have
been achieved without imposing such a burden.46
44. Id. at 581-83 (citations and footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 583 n.25.
46. This particular aspect of Jackson might be seen as a limitation of Griffin, since
Griffin never discussed the concept of "needless" encouragement. In Jackson, the
Court acknowledged that at least some burdens on constitutional rights might
nevertheless be upheld-so long as those burdens served important, legitimate goals
and were not "needless." Id. at 582.
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The Court rejected the Government's request to remedy the
constitutional defect by simply ordering federal trial judges not to
accept guilty pleas or jury trial waivers in capital cases under the Act.'
The Court acknowledged that defendants do not have a constitutional
right to plead guilty or waive jury trial, but noted that the
Government's preferred remedy would have a "cruel impact" on
defendants who truly did not want to contest their own guilt, and by
eliminating guilty pleas would "rob the criminal process of much of its
flexibility." At the same time, however, the Court rejected the trial
judge's position that the entire Act must be invalidated. Instead, the
Court held that the proper remedy was to strike the death-penalty
provision, which had been added to the statute two years after its
original enactment, but leave in place the remainder of the Act."
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S
POST-JACKSON DECISIONS
A. Brady v. United States and Parker v. North Carolina
Shortly after the decision in Jackson, the Court had the opportunity
to clarify its observation in Jackson that not all guilty pleas rendered
to avoid the death penalty are necessarily coerced or involuntary."' In
Brady v. United States,5 1 the defendant had pleaded guilty in 1959 to a
charge of kidnaping under the very same Federal Kidnaping Act that
was at issue in Jackson. After the decision in Jackson, he sought post-
conviction relief on the ground, inter alia, that his guilty plea was
coerced.52
The Supreme Court refused to overturn the defendant's conviction,
holding that Jackson did not require the invalidation of all guilty pleas
entered to avoid the (now-unconstitutional) death penalty provision
under the Federal Kidnaping Act. 3 According to the Court:
47. Id. at 583.
48. Id at 584 (internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. at 585-91. The Court noted that the death-penalty provision was added to
the statute in 1934, two years after the original enactment of the Federal Kidnaping
Act, evidencing that Congress would likely have supported its severability from the
remainder of the Act. Id. at 586-89.
One year after its decision in Jackson, the Court faced an identical challenge to the
Federal Bank Robbery Act in Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968). The
Solicitor General admitted that the statute in Pope -suffers from the same
constitutional infirmity" as the one in Jackson, and the Court, in a brief per curiam
opinion, invalidated the death-penalty provision in that statute as well. Id. at 651
(quoting Jackson).
50. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583.
51. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
52. Id. at 744.
53. Id. at 747.
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The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by
considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it. One of
these circumstances was the possibility of a heavier sentence
following a guilty verdict after a trial. It may be that Brady, faced
with a strong case against him and recognizing that his chances for
acquittal were slight, preferred to plead guilty and thus limit the
penalty to life imprisonment rather than to elect a jury trial which
could result in a death penalty. But even if we assume that Brady
would not have pleaded guilty except for the death penalty provision
[in the Act], this assumption merely identifies the penalty provision
as a "but for" cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in
this sense does not necessaril prove that the plea was coerced and
invalid as an involuntary act.
The Court noted that "[t]he State to some degree encourages pleas of
guilty at every important step in the criminal process."" Some
defendants plead guilty because they know that they broke the law;
others do so only after the shock of being arrested and charged with a
crime; still others do so to avoid the agony and expense of a trial when
the evidence of guilt is strong. "All these pleas of guilty are valid in
spite of the State's responsibility for some of the factors motivating
the pleas ... ."56
The Court proceeded to expound on the general value of plea
bargaining, even though Brady itself did not involve traditional plea
bargaining but a statutory "discount" for defendants who chose to
plead guilty. 7 The Court stated its view that guilty pleas entered to
avoid the possible negative consequences of a trial are "inherent in
the criminal law and its administration," and provide significant
advantages to both the State and the defendant:58
54. Id. at 749-50 (citations and footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 750.
56. Id.
57. Traditional plea bargaining involves a discretionary process of negotiation
between the prosecutor and the defendant (through defense counsel), in the hope of
reaching an agreement that will benefit both parties. The prosecutor usually benefits
by not having to go to trial, and the defendant usually benefits by obtaining a
discounted punishment.
Statutory "discounts," on the other hand, are created by the legislature and written
into statutes. Such statutes may take several forms. For example, some statutes, as in
Jackson and Brady, do not require prosecutorial consent to the entry of the guilty
plea and the consequent discounting of the defendant's punishment. See id. at 743-44;
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584-85 (1968). In such schemes, the defendant
is under no particular obligation to negotiate with the prosecutor; the discount can be
obtained through unilateral action by the defendant. Other statutes, as in Atkinson v.
North Carolina, require prosecutorial consent and thus may encourage a modicum of
negotiation (because the defendant must obtain prosecutorial consent in order to
obtain the discount). Atkinson v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971), rev'g State v.
Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969). These statutory differences, and
others, will be examined later in this article. See infra notes 411-20 and accompanying
text.
58. Brady, 397 U.S. at 751-52.
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It is this mutuality of advantage that perhaps explains the fact that at
present well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this
country rest on pleas of guilty, a great many of them no doubt
motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser
penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a
trial to judge or jury.... [W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional
for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends
a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea
that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the
correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success
in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise
be necessary.59
Finally, as to the argument that Brady's guilty plea was not
intelligently made, because he did not know at the time he entered his
plea that the death-penalty provision of the Act would later be held
unconstitutional in Jackson, the Court pointed out that plea decisions
"frequently present imponderable questions for which there are no
certain answers; judgments may be made that in the light of later
events seem improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the
time." 6  Given that Brady had been properly advised by defense
counsel, and given that the Government had never misrepresented the
range of possible punishments Brady faced, the subsequent ruling in
Jackson did not affect "the truth or reliability of his plea."'"
Justice Brennan, concurring in the result in Brady and dissenting in
the companion case of Parker v. North Carolina,62 differentiated
between statutory "discounts" for pleading guilty and traditional plea
bargaining. According to Justice Brennan, the difference is that plea
bargaining represents a "give-and-take negotiation... between the
prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal
bargaining power."63 His opinion also acknowledged, however, that
by involving potential death sentences, both types of penalty schemes,
including those at issue in Parker and Brady, injected a factor of
considerable gravity absent from most plea-bargaining situations.
Justice Brennan emphasized that "the threat of a death penalty [is] a
factor to be given considerable weight in determining whether a
defendant has deliberately waived his constitutional rights,"' drawing
a parallel with the Court's decision in Fay v. Noia.1 This 1963
decision rejected the notion that a federal habeas corpus petitioner
confronted by the "grisly choice" of waiving his appellate rights or
facing a possible death sentence if his appeal was successful could be
59. Id- at 752-53 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 756-57.
61. Id. at 757.
62. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
63. Id. at 809 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
64. Id at 810 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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barred from seeking federal habeas review based upon his failure to
pursue state appeals. Under Justice Brennan's view, relief from guilty
pleas entered pursuant to any "legislatively mandated
unconstitutional death penalty scheme,"' whether made in response
to a pure statutory "discount" (as in Brady) or through a statutorily-
authorized mechanism more closely resembling traditional plea
bargaining (as in Parker), should be constitutionally required
whenever the defendant can demonstrate that the unconstitutional
death-penalty scheme played a significant role in his determination to
plead guilty.67
B. North Carolina v. Alford
In North Carolina v. Alford," the Court faced a situation virtually
identical to the ones in Brady and Parker. The only potentially
meaningful differences between Alford and Parker, which involved
the same North Carolina statute, were that (1) Alford pleaded guilty
not to the original charge, but to a lesser-included offense-namely,
second-degree murder-under the statute which the Court had not yet
invalidated under Jackson69 (although the Jackson problem with the
statute had already been acknowledged by the court below7°), and (2)
Alford maintained throughout the plea proceedings that he was
innocent of the murder, and claimed later that the "principal
motivation" for his plea was fear of the death penalty.7'
Citing Brady, the Court flatly rejected Alford's claim that his plea
was involuntary because it was made primarily to avoid the death
penalty:
That [Alford] would not have pleaded except for the opportunity to
limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that the
plea of guilty was not the product of a free and rational choice,
especially where the defendant was represented by competent
counsel whose advice was that the plea would be to the defendant's
advantage.72
66. Parker, 397 U.S. at 812 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 812-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
69. The North Carolina statute allowed defendants to plead guilty to a charge of
first-degree murder but mandated a punishment of life imprisonment, rather than
death, in such cases. This statute was repealed in 1969, six years after Alford's
conviction of second-degree murder upon a guilty plea. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 27 n.l.
One year after the Supreme Court's decision in Alford, the Court invalidated the
North Carolina statute-setting aside a series of death sentences imposed under that
statute-in Atkinson v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
70. See Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968), vacated and
remanded, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
71. Alford, 400 U.S. at 28,30.
72. Id. at 31.
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The Court also rejected the related claim that the plea was
involuntary because Afford had refused to admit his guilt.3
The Court in Alford proceeded to explain that the reasoning of the
lower court-that a guilty plea is invalid if "principally motivat[ed]"
by the death penalty-would have the necessary effect of invalidating
not only a plea to first-degree murder, but also (as in Alford itself) a
plea to second-degree murder.74 The Court rejected the view of the
lower court that Jackson should have such a broad impact:
The States in their wisdom... may prohibit the practice of accepting
pleas to lesser included offenses under any circumstances. But this
is not the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of
Rights. The prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent pleas
should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid logic
render those constitutional guarantees counterproductive andput in
jeopardy the very human values they were meant to preserve."-
C. Atkinson v. North Carolina
In Atkinson v. North Carolina76 and its companion cases,' the
Supreme Court addressed a Jackson challenge to the same North
Carolina statute at issue in Parker. Under that statute, if a defendant
wished to plead guilty to murder, he was required to tender a signed
guilty plea; the plea would be formally entered only if the prosecutor,
with the trial court's approval, accepted it.' If the prosecutor
accepted the plea, the defendant would receive life imprisonment; if
the prosecutor rejected the plea, however, the defendant would go to
trial and would face a possible death sentence. The Court held-in a
summary disposition without any discussion or analysis-that the
North Carolina statute was unconstitutional under Jackson.
79
D. Bordenkircher v. Hayes
In 1978, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes0 (not a capital case), the Court
finally addressed squarely, and upheld, the constitutionality of plea
bargaining. In Hayes, the defendant was initially charged with
"uttering a forged instrument," a crime normally carrying a potential
73. Id. at 31-39.
74. Indeed, the Court noted that although the North Carolina statute allowing
defendants to avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty to first-degree murder had
been repealed in 1969, "it seemingly remains possible for a person charged with a
capital offense to plead guilty to a lesser charge." Id. at 27 n.1.
75. Id. at 39.
76. 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
77. See Hill v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971); Roseboro v. North Carolina,
403 U.S. 948 (1971); Williams v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971); Sanders v.
North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
7& See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 792 n.2 (1970).
79. See Atkinson. 403 U.S. at 948.
80. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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sentence of two to ten years in prison.8 Because Hayes had two prior
felony convictions, however, he could have been indicted under the
Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, which would have required a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.12 The prosecutor
threatened to seek such an indictment if Hayes did not agree to plead
guilty to the original charge and accept a five-year sentence. Hayes
refused to plead guilty and was indicted under the Habitual Criminal
Act, found guilty at a jury trial, and sentenced to life imprisonment.8"
The Supreme Court found no constitutional violation in the
prosecutor's use of the Habitual Criminal Act as leverage to try to
obtain a guilty plea from Hayes.' The Court noted that because the
prosecutor told Hayes the truth about his intentions, the case was
essentially identical to one in which the defendant was initially
charged under the Habitual Criminal Act and the prosecutor then
offered to drop that charge in exchange for a guilty plea."
Distinguishing earlier cases that condemned retaliatory acts by
prosecutors against defendants who asserted their constitutional
rights, the Court explained:
In those cases the Court was dealing with the State's unilateral
imposition of a penalty upon a defendant.. .- a situation "very
different from the give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably
possess relatively equal bargaining power."... To punish a person
because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due
process violation of the most basic sort .... But in the 'give-and-
take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or
retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the
prosecution's offer.86
The Court concluded:
While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe
punishment clearly may have a "discouraging effect on the
defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these
difficult choices [is] an inevitable" -and permissible -"attribute of
any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the
negotiation of pleas." It follows that, by tolerating and encouraging
the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's
interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo
his right to plead not guilty.87
81. Id. at 358.
82. Id. at 358-59.
83. Id. at 359.
84. See id. at 365.
85. See id. at 364-65.
86. Id. at 362-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,809 (1970)).
87. Id. at 364 (citation omitted).
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E. Corbitt v. New Jersey
In 1978, in Corbitt v. New Jersey) (another non-capital case), the
Supreme Court faced a situation that-at least on the surface-
appeared to resemble closely the one presented in Jackson. The
Corbin case involved a New Jersey homicide statute that
distinguished, for punishment purposes, between defendants who
were convicted at a jury trial and those who were convicted on the
basis of non vult or nolo contendere pleas.' For defendants convicted
of murder at a jury trial, the jury was required to determine whether
the murder was in the first or second degree; first-degree murder was
punished by mandatory life imprisonment, whereas second-degree
murder was punished by a term of no more than thirty years. For
defendants convicted of murder on the basis of non vult or nolo
contendere pleas, on the other hand, the trial judge was authorized to
impose, at his discretion, either a life sentence or a term of no more
than thirty years.9 Corbitt was convicted at a jury trial of murder,
which the jury found to be in the first degree, and was thus sentenced
to life imprisonment. Relying heavily on Jackson, Corbitt argued on
appeal that, because a defendant convicted for the same crime on a
non vult or nolo contendere plea could be given a lesser sentence by
the trial judge, the New Jersey statute imposed an unconstitutional
burden on his Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to
incriminate himself as well as his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.91
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the New Jersey statute
was not unconstitutional under Jackson for several reasons. The
"principal" reason, according to the Court, was that "the pressures to
forgo trial and to plead to the charge in this case are not what they
were in Jackson."9 For one thing, the New Jersey statute, unlike the
one in Jackson, did not provide for a possible death sentence. The
Court described this information as a "material fact," but not
necessarily a dispositive one.93 Moreover, the defendant in Corbitt
could not entirely avoid the maximum punishment of life
imprisonment by pleading non vult or nolo contendere, since the trial
judge could still impose that punishment (although it would no longer
be mandatory).94 Having noted these important differences between
Corbitt and Jackson, however, the Court admitted that the defendant
in Corbitt could (and did) nevertheless make a credible Jackson-type
88. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
89. Id. at 215 (citing NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:113-3 (West 1969)).
90. Id. at 215-16.
91. Id. at 216.
92. Id at 217.
93. Id.
94. Id.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
argument that the New Jersey statute unconstitutionally burdened his
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights."
The Court then turned to the general subject of plea bargaining,
which it had not discussed at all in Jackson but had discussed
extensively in intervening cases like Brady, Alford, and Hayes. The
Corbitt Court wrote:
The cases in this Court since Jackson have clearly established that
not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not
every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.
Specifically, there is no per se rule against encouraging guilty pleas.
We have squarely held that a State may encourage a guilty plea by
offering substantial benefits in return for the plea. The plea may
obtain for the defendant "the possibility or certainty... [not only of]
a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be imposed after a trial
and a verdict of guilty... ," but also of a lesser penalty than that
required to be imposed after a guilty verdict by a jury.96
In a footnote to the above passage, the Court observed that
"[d]ecisions after Jackson sustained practices that, although
encouraging guilty pleas, were not 'needless."'" The Court cited, as
examples, numerous plea-bargaining cases such as Brady, Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe,98 McMann v. Richardson,99 Parker, Alford, Santobello v.
New York,"° and Hayes.
Based on these post-Jackson plea-bargaining cases, the Corbitt
Court concluded:
"[B]y tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court
has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple
reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to
persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty."
There is no difference of constitutional significance between
Bordenkircher [v. Hayes] and this case.... In Bordenkircher [v.
Hayes], as permitted by state law, the prosecutor was willing to
forgo the habitual criminal count if there was a plea, in which event
the mandatory sentence would have been avoided. Here, the state
law empowered the judge to impose a lesser term either in
connection with a plea bargain or otherwise. In both cases, the
defendant gave up the possibility of leniency if he went to trial and
was convicted on the count carrying the mandatory penalty. In
Bordenkircher [v. Hayes], the probability or certainty of leniency in
return for a plea did not invalidate the mandatory penalty imposed
after a jury trial. It should not do so here, where there was no
95. See id. at 225 & n.15.
96. Id. at 218-20 (omissions and alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,751 (1978)).
97. Id. at 219 n.9.
98. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
99. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
100. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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assurance that a plea would be accepted if tendered and, if it had
been, no assurance that a sentence less than life would be imposed.
Those matters rested ultimately in the discretion of the judge,
perhaps substantially influenced by the prosecutor and the plea-
bargaining process permitted by New Jersey law.
Bordenkircher [v. Hayes], like other cases here, unequivocally
recognized the State's legitimate interest in encouraging the entry of
guilty pleas and in facilitating plea bargaining, a process mutually
beneficial to both the defendant and the State. In pursuit of this
interest, New Jersey has provided that the judge may, but need not,
accept pleas of non vult and that he may impose life or the specified
term of years. This not only provides for discretion in the trial judge
but also sets the limits within which plea bargaining on punishment
may take place. The New Jersey Supreme Court observed [below]
that the "encouragement of guilty defendants not to contest their
guilt is at the very heart of an effective plea negotiation program."
Its conclusion was that in this light there were substantial benefits to
the State in providing the opportunity for lesser punishment and
that the statutory pattern could not be deemed a needless or
arbitrary burden on the defendant's constitutional rights within the
meaning of United States v. Jackson.
We are in essential agreement with the New Jersey Supreme
Court.101
Justice Stewart, the author of Jackson, concurred in the judgment in
Corbitt. He agreed with the majority that Jackson was not controlling,
based (in his view) on the absence of the death penalty and the fact
that the sentencing judge remained free to impose the same maximum
punishment of life in prison that would have been mandatory after
conviction by a jury trial."0 2 He disagreed, however, with the
majority's view that the effect of the New Jersey statute was
constitutionally indistinguishable from the practice of plea bargaining
that had been upheld in Hayes. According to Justice Stewart (and
echoing Justice Brennan's separate opinion concurring in Brady and
dissenting in Parker), there is a "vast difference" between the effect of
a statutory "discount" for guilty pleas and the individualized "give-
and-take" of plea negotiations:
Could a state legislature provide that the penalty for every criminal
offense to which a defendant pleads guilty is to be one-half the
penalty to be imposed upon a defendant convicted of the same
offense after a not-guilty plea? I would suppose that such legislation
would be clearly unconstitutional under United States v. Jackson. 10
101. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 221-23 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 74 NJ. 379, 396,
378 A.2d 235, 243-44 (1977)).
102. Id. at 226 (Stewart, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 227-28.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The three dissenters (Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall)
characterized the New Jersey statute as providing a punishment for
"'false' not-guilty plea[s]"''1 4 (i.e., a punishment-namely, mandatory
life imprisonment-that applies only to defendants who plead not
guilty and are then convicted by a jury trial). They rejected the
majority's claim that the New Jersey statute was functionally
equivalent to plea bargaining by a prosecutor, and they concluded that
Jackson was violated because "a plea cannot at once be criminally
punishable and constitutionally protected."' 5  The three dissenters
claimed that, as a result of the majority's decision in Corbitt, "[t]he
holding in Jackson, though not specifically overruled, has been
divorced from the rationale on which it rested.' 0 6
Corbitt was the last significant Supreme Court decision to rely upon,
or interpret, Jackson. Because all pre-Jackson death-penalty statutes
were invalidated by Furman v. Georgia1°7 in 1972, and because all
post-Furman death-penalty statutes were drafted with Jackson in
mind, no significant Jackson problem arose in the capital-case context
after Corbitt. Additionally, because plea bargaining by prosecutors-
which was upheld in Brady and Alford, even in the shadow of the
death penalty-became even more ubiquitous after Brady and Hayes,
largely eliminating the need for statutory "discounts," no significant
Jackson problem arose in the non-capital-case context after Corbitt
either. This caused the Jackson issue to recede into virtual dormancy
for more than twenty years between Corbitt and the current
controversy over the New York death-penalty statute.
III. THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE WITH PLEA BARGAINING IN
DEATH-PENALTY CASES
A. The History of the Death Penalty in New York
In 1995, New York became the thirty-eighth state in the modern era
to enact a capital punishment law,'08 authorizing the imposition of the
death penalty for the commission of twelve specified categories of
intentional murder. 9 Capital punishment is not new to New York,
however, as the state's use of the death penalty dates from colonial
104. Id. at 228 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 229.
106. Id.
107. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
108. The modem era of capital punishment in the United States is generally viewed
as having commenced with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and its
companion cases. See infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
109. Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1.
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days, 10 and has changed dramatically over the intervening centuries to
reflect the political and social climate of the times."'
Over the three centuries during which New York has had a death
penalty, the crimes punishable by death gradually diminished from a
nearly indiscriminate list in the seventeenth century, following the
approach then prevalent in England and the American colonies, to a
more restrictive list by 1788.112 Perhaps as a consequence of a growing
movement to abolish the death penalty in mid-nineteenth century
New York,"3 by 1862, the number of capital crimes in New York had
been reduced to two-first-degree murder and treason"-and
remained so until kidnaping was added after the Lindbergh case in
1933."1 By 1965, capital punishment was available only in certain
limited classes of murders."6
Three particular strands of New York's capital jurisprudence
intertwined to create the tapestry which informed the New York
Court of Appeals opinion considering the continuing vitality of
Jackson in Matter of Hynes v. Tornei."7 These three concepts-
mandatory death sentencing, the unwaivable requirement of trial by
jury, and the ban on guilty pleas in potential capital cases-were each
deeply enmeshed in New York's earlier capital jurisprudence, helped
define the state's new capital punishment law, and served as the
backdrop for the Court's decision.
110. See State of N.Y. Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and Crim. Code
("Temporary Commission"), Special Report on Capital Punishment, 1965 Legis. Doe.
25, at 83 [hereinafter Commission Report].
111. For a detailed analysis of this history, see id. at 80-85. See also William C.
Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27, at 381-84 (McKinney
1998); James R. Acker. New York's Proposed Death Penalty Legislation:
Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 54 Alb. L. Rev. 515 (1990); Michael Lumer &
Nancy Tenney, The Death Penalty in New York: An Historical Perspective, 4 J.L. &
Pol'y 81 (1995); A. Majid et al., The Death Penalty in New York, Crim. Just. J.,
N.Y.S.B.A., Winter 1998, vol. 6, no. 2, at 11.
112. In 1788, the New York Legislature limited capital crimes to murder, treason,
rape, buggery, burglary, larceny from a church, arson, mayhem, and certain types of
counterfeiting and forgery. Commission Report, supra note 110. at 81-83.
113. No fewer than thirteen legislative committees considered the question of
complete abolition of capital punishment during the mid-nineteenth century, and
approximately half of them endorsed the concept. Id. at 83-84; see, e.g., John L
O'Sullivan, Report in Favor of the Abolition of the Punishment of Death by Law,
Made to the Legislature of tire State of New York (2d ed. 1841), reprinted in Criminal
Justice In America 8 (Robert M. Fogelson et al. eds., 1974). The Select Committee
chaired by Assemblymember O'Sullivan prepared the report in response to a
gubernatorial request, and concluded that "the punishment of death by law ought to
be forthwith and forever abolished by the State of New York; the penalty of
imprisonment for life, at labor, in solitude, and beyond the reach of the possibility of
Executive clemency, being substituted therefor." Id. (emphasis omitted).
114. Commission Report, supra note 110, at 83-84.
115. See Act of Aug. 25, 1933, ch. 773, 1933 N.Y. Laws 1586.
116. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
117. 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1998), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1015 (1999).
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1. Mandatory Sentencing Provisions
Despite its limited number of death-eligible crimes during the latter
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the New York law was one
of the more severe in the country, as its death sentence was
mandatory.11 8 Neither the jury nor the judge had any authority to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment 1 9 By 1937, the mandatory
sentencing requirements had been relaxed to the extent that the jury
could make a recommendation to the trial court of a sentence of
imprisonment for first-degree murder based on theories of felony
murder or depraved recklessness, and for kidnaping.12 0 Courts were
free to reject the jury's recommendation, however, and impose a
death sentence.
Although New York's death-penalty laws remained unchanged for
the next quarter century, by the 1950s, the popularity of capital
punishment had again begun to wane, and the New York Legislature
repeatedly entertained the possibility of abolishing it entirely.,', In
1963, the New York Legislature enacted major changes in the state's
capital punishment law at the behest of the Temporary Commission
on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code ("Temporary
Commission"). 22 Among its changes, the new legislation repealed the
mandatory death sentence for the crime of premeditated murder,
authorized a sentence of life imprisonment in any capital case unless
the jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death, and made
the jury's recommendation binding upon the court. 23 The new
118. Commission Report, supra note 110, at 84.
119. Id.
120. Act of Mar. 17, 1937, ch. 67, sec. 2, § 1045-a, 1937 N.Y. Laws 121. With
respect to those crimes, the law provided that "[a] jury... may, as a part of its verdict,
recommend that the defendant be imprisoned for the term of his natural life." Id.
Treason and all other forms of first-degree murder continued to carry a mandatory
sentence of death.
121. Commission Report, supra note 110, at 84-85; Acker, supra note 111, at 522 &
n.38. Professor Acker also reports that bills to abolish the death penalty were
introduced in the New York State Legislature every year from 1950 through 1962. Id.
at 522 & n.39.
122. Commission Report, supra note 110, at 79-80. The Commission's charge, in
relevant part, was to "'reappraise, in the light of current knowledge and thinking,
existing substantive provisions relating to sentencing, the imposing of penalties and
the theory of punishment relating to crime."' Id. at 79 (quoting Act of Apr. 6, 1961,
ch. 346, sec. 2(d), 1961 N.Y. Laws 1275, 1276); see also Act of Apr. 6, 1961, ch. 346,
1961 N.Y. Laws 1275, as amended by Act of Apr. 18, 1962, ch. 548, 1962 N.Y. Laws
2513.
123. Act of May 3, 1963, ch. 994, secs. 1,2, §§ 1045, 1045-a, 1963 N.Y. Laws 3018;
see Commission Report, supra note 110, at 80. Until these changes, New York had
been the only state still employing a mandatory death penalty for capital crimes.
Interim Report of the State of N.Y. Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and
Crim. Code, 1963 Legis. Doc. 8, at 13 [hereinafter Interim Report]; Commission
Report, supra note 110, at 80.
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legislation thereby effectively changed the presumptive sentence for
capital crimes committed in New York from death to life."-4
In 1965, with the movement to abolish the death penalty continuing,
the Temporary Commission recommended that "capital punishment
in the State of New York be abolished by appropriate legislation with
an immediately effective date."" The Legislature responded by
drastically limiting the death penalty, abolishing it except in cases of
murders of police or corrections officers acting in the line of duty, and
murders by life-term inmates.126
By 1972, New York was one of many states that left the imposition
of the death penalty entirely to the jury's discretion. That year, the
United States Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia," declared that
state death-penalty laws reposing unfettered discretion in the
sentencer resulted in arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. One year later,
in People v. Fitzpatrick,"8 the New York Court of Appeals struck
down New York's capital punishment law as violative of the principles
set forth in Furman.
New York's legislature then adopted the view, expressed by the
Court of Appeals in Fitzpatrick and shared by a minority of other
states,129 that the lesson of Furman was that only a mandatory death
sentence could satisfy the guided discretion requirements of the
federal Constitution.30 In 1974, the New York legislature enacted a
new death-penalty law which restored the mandatory imposition of
death for virtually the same types of murder as did the previous
statute. 3'
124. Act of May 3, 1963, ch. 994, secs. 2, 3, §§ 1045-a, 1250, 1963 N.Y. Laws 3018,
3018-19. Once the defendant had been convicted of a capital crime, a separate
penalty-stage trial procedure was authorized to enable the jury to consider the
possible sentencing alternatives of life imprisonment and death. Id.; see Interim
Report, supra note 123, at 15-16.
125. Commission Report, supra note 110, at 68.
126. Act of June 1, 1965, ch. 321, sec. 1, § 1045(4), 1965 N.Y. Laws 1021, 1022.
127. 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
128. 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973), and cert denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973).
129. Apparently some ten states adopted mandatory death-penalty provisions after
Furman. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 313 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
130. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d at 512-13, 300 N.E.2d at 145-46,346 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
131. Act of May 17, 1974, ch. 367, sec. 2, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1209, 1209-10 (amending
Penal Law § 60.06); Id. sec. 5 at 1210 (amending Penal Law § 125.27). Death became
the mandatory sentence for the redefined crime of first-degree murder, which was
limited to three types of intentional murders: the killing of a police officer engaged in
performing official duties, the killing of a correctional employee engaged in
performing official duties, and a killing committed by an inmate serving a life term of
incarceration. In a background letter explaining the legislative goals of the bill, the
principal drafter advised the Governor's counsel that the mandatory death sentence
feature was "made necessary" by Furman:
[T]he surest method to provide New York State wvith a constitutional death
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New York's legislature misjudged the direction of the constitutional
jurisprudence, however, and did not anticipate the Supreme Court's
rejection in 1976 of mandatory sentencing schemes for failing to allow
individualized sentencing.1 2 Applying the Supreme Court's rulings in
these cases, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated New York's
statute soon thereafter. 3 3 From that time until the enactment of the
current statute in 1995, the death penalty was not authorized in New
York.
2. Waiver of Jury Trial
Until 1938, New York law did not permit defendants in criminal
cases to elect to forego jury trials, as the right was deemed essential
for the defendant's protection. 34 That year, the State Constitutional
Convention amended the New York State Constitution to allow most
criminal defendants to waive a trial by jury. The new provision
nonetheless continued the ban in cases in which death was a possible
sentence.135  The Bill of Rights Subcommittee to the Constitutional
Convention, which drafted this provision, explained that its
determination to withhold the jury waiver right from capital
defendants derived from the notion "that the Constitution will still not
permit this choice to a defendant in a capital case, and regards such a
penalty was to provide a mandatory death sentence for specific and carefully
defined cases. This would establish a legislative determination that these
crimes could only be deterred by the death penalty. The alternative was to
provide specific and detailed standards for juries to follow in determining
whether a death sentence should be imposed. This approach was rejected as
one which would not in fact eliminate the capricious, wanton and freakish
imposition of the penalty which was the basis for Justices Stewart's and
White's opinions in the Furman case. It was felt that detailing mitigating
circumstances such as impaired capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of
conduct, substantial duress and minor participation, or aggravated
circumstances such as prior convictions, commission in a heinous, cruel or
depraved manner, would merely give the jury the opportunity to exercise the
same broad discretion they now exercise with none of these sentencing
criteria set forth in the law.
Letter from Dale M. Volker, Assemblymember, to Michael Whiteman, Counsel to
the Governor (May 14, 1974) (on file with author).
132. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280;
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
133. People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985) (murder by life-term inmate); People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d
17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1978), and
cert. denied sub nom. New York v. James, 438 U.S. 914 (1978) (murder of corrections
officer).
134. People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 300, 229 N.E.2d 419, 420,
282 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (1967); see James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An
Overview and Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation, 17 Pace L. Rev. 41,
93 & n.197 (1996).
135. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2 ("A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all
criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death....").
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prohibition against waiver as a measure for the protection of the
defendant." '136
In September 1967, the Temporary Commission promulgated a
Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law" ' which, inter alia,
included a statutory ban on jury trial waivers in cases in which the
defendant faced a potential death sentence.":  The provision
incorporated a procedure by which the court would determine
whether or not the indictment charged such a crime."-9 The proposal
was enacted when the Criminal Procedure Law was adopted in
1970.140
The 1970 provision was repealed when the Legislature adopted the
mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder in 1974.141 At that
point, given the 1974 law's mandatory sentence of death upon
conviction of first-degree murder, there was no need for a procedure
to determine whether the charge was one for which a death sentence
could be imposed, and it was abandoned. In a departure from the
constitutional language forbidding non-jury trials where "'the crime
charged may be punishable by death,"'4" the new provision prohibited
jury waivers "where the indictment charges the crime of murder in the
first degree. "143 Although the language of the two provisions
136. N.Y. Constitutional Convention Comm., Problems Relating to Bill of Rights
and General Welfare 14 (1938).
137. Temporary Commission. Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law
(1967).
138. Id Proposed Criminal Procedure Law § 165.10(1) provided: -Except where
the indictment charges a crime for which a sentence of death may be imposed upon
conviction, the defendant... may at any time before trial waive a jury trial and
consent to a trial without a jury in the superior court in which the indictment is
pending." Id.
139. Proposed Criminal Procedure Law § 165.10(3) provided that the indictment
charged "a crime for which a sentence of death may be imposed" when there was
"some possibility" that the elements of capital murder were present. i. It then
provided:
In determining whether there is some possibility of the existence of the
factors specified in this subdivision so as to preclude a waiver of a jury trial,
the court must, in addition to examining the indictment, examine the
minutes of the grand jury proceeding underlying the indictment and conduct
any further inquiry which may be necessary to acquire the information
essential to such determination.
Id.
140. Act of May 20, 1970, ch. 996, 1970 N.Y. Laws 3117, 329 (enacted as N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10(3) (McKinney 1993)).
141. See supra note 131 and accompanying text: tifra notes 162-66 and
accompanying text.
142. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2.
143. Act of May 17, 1974. ch. 367, sec. 15, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1209, 1213 (enacted as
amended at N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10(1) (McKinney 1993)). Section 320.10 was
amended to read: "Except where the indictment charges the crime of murder in the
first degree, the defendant... may at any time before trial waive a jury trial and
consent to a trial without a jury ... " Id. (emphasis omitted).
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diverged, in view of the statutory framework, the distinction was
without any substantive effect.
3. Availability of Guilty Pleas
Prior to 1881, criminal defendants in New York were not required
to enter formal pleas, but merely to state at arraignment upon the
indictment whether or not they were demanding a trial.1" In 1881,
New York's legislature enacted a new Penal Code and a new Code of
Criminal Procedure which made sweeping changes in the state's
substantive and procedural criminal law.1 45 These new laws codified
for the first time the types of pleas that could be entered upon an
indictment.1 46
In 1889, the new plea provision was amended, and for the first time
in New York the right to enter a plea of guilty was eliminated for
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.1 47 The sole reported
decision interpreting this provision rejected a claim that the statute
barred a plea of guilty to manslaughter, which carried a sentence of a
term of years, where the indictment charged murder in the first
degree1 48
In 1897, the Legislature amended the plea provision once again, this
time limiting the ban on pleas to cases in which death was a potential
punishment. 49 The language that had been added in 1889 was
modified to read: "A conviction shall not be had upon a plea of guilty
where the crime charged is or may be punishable by death."' 5
144. See, e.g., 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., part IV, ch. II, Tit. IV, § 74 (6th ed. 1875).
145. Act of June 1, 1881, ch. 442, 1881 N.Y. Laws 601 (enacting Code of Criminal
Procedure); Act of July 26, 1881, ch. 676, 1881 N.Y. Laws 913 (enacting Penal Code).
146. Act of June 1, 1881, ch. 442, 1881 N.Y. Laws 601. The Code of Criminal
Procedure section 332 provided:
There are three kinds of pleas to an indictment:
1. A plea of guilty.
2. A plea of not guilty.
3. A plea of a former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the crime
charged, which may be pleaded either with or without the plea of not guilty.
Act of Apr. 27, 1967, ch. 681, sec. 51, § 332, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1591, 1605.
147. Act of June 6, 1889, ch. 384, sec. 1, § 332, 1889 N.Y. Laws 532, 532. Section
332 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to read:
There are three kinds of pleas to an indictment; a plea of (1) guilty, (2) not
guilty, (3) a former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the crime charged,
which may be pleaded either with or without the plea of not guilty. But no
conviction shall be had upon a plea of guilty in either of the following cases:
(a.) where the crime charged is punishable by death, or (b.) where the crime
charged is or may be punishable by imprisonment in a State prison for the
term of life.
Id. (Emphasis added, designating new text).
148. People v. Smith, 78 Hun. 179, 28 N.Y.S. 912 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 2d Dep't
1894).
149. Act of May 14, 1897, ch. 427, sec. 1, § 332, 1897 N.Y. Laws 569, 570.
150. Id.
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No legislative history exists to explain the origin of New York's
proscription of guilty pleas in potential death-penalty cases in the late
nineteenth century. One possible explanation is that the ban on guilty
pleas in cases involving potential death sentences, like the prohibition
of bench trials in capital cases, was meant to protect the capital
defendant from bypassing a jury trial in favor of a course of action
tantamount to state-sanctioned suicide. 5' Another possible
explanation may be found in the general reluctance of legislators in
the late nineteenth century to permit the imposition of a death
sentence solely on the basis of the defendant's confession, without
judicial scrutiny or some corroborating evidence. States that did
permit pleas to crimes carrying sentences of death generally required
the production of evidence in court before a sentence of death could
be pronounced. 152 This requirement protected against the possibility
that human error in the charging decision, or pressures on the
defendant to plead guilty, might result in the execution of an innocent
151. See Interim Report, supra note 123, at 16 ("The spirit and purpose of [section
332] are to outlaw any possibility of a defendant pleading himself into the electric
chair."). The experience of New York's neighboring state of New Jersey around the
same time may also hold parallels to the origin of New York's policy. In Hallinger v.
Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892), the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a
capital murder conviction. The conviction was based upon a guilty plea under a New
Jersey statute which permitted a plea of guilty followed by the court's examination of
witnesses to determine the degree of murder committed, and, concomitantly, whether
a death sentence was appropriate. The Supreme Court noted that similar statutes
were in effect in other states, and found no intrusion on the right to either due process
of law or trial by jury. Id. at 318.
The following year, New Jersey amended its law, eliminating the right to plead
guilty where death was a possible sentence. The new statute provided:
[A]nd in no case shall the plea of guilty be received upon any indictment for
murder, and if, upon arraignment, such plea of guilty should be offered it
shall be disregarded and a plea of not guilty entered, and a jury, duly
impaneled, shall try the case in manner aforesaid; provided, however, that
nothing herein contained shall prevent the accused of pleading non vult or
nolo contendere to such indictment; the sentence to be imposed, if such plea
be accepted, shall be the same as that imposed upon a conviction of murder
of the second degree.
Act of Mar. 1, 1893, ch. 36, sec. 1, § 68, 1893 N.J. Gen. Pub. Laws 82, 83. Where the
prosecutor did not accept the non vult or nolo contendere plea (and its accompanying
second-degree murder non-death sentence), however, the defendant was required to
proceed to a jury trial. Id. In State v. Genz, 57 NJ.L. 459,31 A. 1037 (1895), the New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this new provision, which had
forced the defendant into the jury trial he wished to avoid by attempting to plead
guilty at arraignment. Addressing the purpose of the no-guilty-plea policy, the court
cited Blackstone's Commentaries as evidence that "[flrom the earliest times, in these
capital cases, judges have manifested a disinclination to proceed to judgment on the
mere admission of the prisoner of his guilt." Id. at 462-63, 31 A. at 1038. The policy
was founded on the presumption "in favoren vitae," and in order to protect
defendants from "a ready and facile road to the gallows." Id. at 462,31 A. at 1038.
152. See, eg., People v. Lennox, 67 Cal. 113, 7 P. 260 (1885) (upholding death
sentence after guilty plea based on court's having heard testimony of witnesses prior
to pronouncing sentence). See generally Annotation, Pleas of Non Vult Contendere or
Guilty in Capital Case, 6 A.L.R 694 (1920).
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person. Finally, the desire to protect the defendant from an
irrevocable decision also may have been a factor.'53
New York's ban on pleas in cases involving potential death
sentences continued unchanged well into the next century!- 4 With the
profound revisions to New York's capital punishment scheme in 1963,
which created an alternative sentence of life imprisonment for all
capital crimes,155 however, the Legislature lifted the blanket ban on
guilty pleas in cases involving a possible death sentence, creating a
statutory avenue for negotiated guilty pleas in potential capital cases.
The operative provisions permitted a defendant, with the consent of
both the court and the prosecutor, to plead guilty where the promised
sentence was incarceration rather than death. 6 Conforming changes
were made in 1965 57 and 1967.58
The Criminal Procedure Law proposed by the Temporary
Commission in 1967 and adopted by the Legislature in 1970 included a
further amendment to the capital-plea provisions designed to expand
the plea opportunities for defendants charged with murder. In
recognition that guilty pleas were then authorized for any offense, but
available as of right only where no death penalty was possible, and
that only a small class of murders remained death eligible,15 9 the new
153. Cf Mounts v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 274, 12 S.W. 311 (1889) (affirming
conviction on plea of guilty despite defendant's effort to withdraw plea after
sentencing jury heard evidence and fixed punishment at death).
154. See, e.g., People v. La Barbera, 274 N.Y. 339, 8 N.E.2d 884 (1937); People v.
McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d 727, 731,662 N.Y.S.2d 214, 217 (Dutchess County Ct. 1997).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
156. Act of May 3, 1963, ch. 994, 1963 N.Y. Laws 3018. Penal Law section 332 was
amended to read: "A conviction shall not be had upon a plea of guilty where the
crime charged is or may be punishable by death, except as otherwise provided in
sections ten hundred forty-five and twelve hundred fifty of the penal law." Id. sec. 5, §
332, at 3023 (emphasis omitted).
Penal Law section 1045(2) was amended to afford the following plea option: "When
the court and the district attorney consent, a defendant indicted for murder in the first
degree may plead guilty to murder in the first degree with a sentence of life
imprisonment, in which case the court shall sentence him accordingly." Id. sec. 1, §
1045(2), at 3018 (emphasis omitted).
Penal Law section 1250(B) was similarly amended to include the following language
allowing for guilty pleas in capital kidnaping cases:
When the court and the district attorney consent, a defendant indicted for
kidnapping upon whom the death penalty would otherwise be imposed, may
plead guilty thereto with a sentence of imprisonment for an indeterminate
term the minimum of which shall be not less than twenty years and the
maximum of which shall be for his natural life, in which case he shall be
sentenced accordingly.
Id. sec. 3, § 1250(B), at 3020 (emphasis omitted).
157. With the elimination of any potential sentence of death for kidnaping in 1965,
the reference to conditional pleas in capital kidnaping cases was eliminated from the
Code of Criminal Procedure section 332, and the alternative sentences for the
remaining crime of capital murder were death or life imprisonment. Act of June 1,
1965, ch. 321, sec. 6, § 332, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1021, 1025.
158. Act of Apr. 27, 1967, ch. 681, sec. 51, § 332, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1591, 1605.
159. Temporary Commission, Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law, §
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measure required the court, upon a defendant's offer to plead guilty
to a murder indictment, to conduct an investigation to determine
whether the death penalty was a possible sentence, and thus whether
the prosecutor's consent to a plea bargain involving a life sentence
was required. 160 This measure referenced and incorporated the
procedures established in the Commission's proposal for investigating
the availability of jury trial waivers in murder cases."'1
The next change in New York's capital-plea provisions occurred as
part of the state's 1974 post-Furman legislative response.""- This new
measure incorporated a complete prohibition of guilty pleas to the
crime of first-degree murder, since the sole available sentence upon
conviction was now death." -  The supporting memorandum of
Assemblymember Dale Volker, the legislative sponsor,"" said merely
that the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law were to "insure
that defendants charged with murder in the first degree may not plead
guilty to such crimes, nor may they waive jury trial in such cases."' 5
115.10, Staff Comment (1967); see supra text accompanying note 126.
160. Temporary Commission, Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law, §
115.10, Staff Comment (1967). Section 115.10(3) provided:
When a defendant desires to enter a plea of guilty to an indictment charging
the crime of murder as defined in subdivision one or three of section 125.25
of the penal law, the court must determine, in the manner provided in
subdivision three of section 165.10 of this chapter, whether a possibility
exists that the defendant, following a verdict of guilty of murder after trial,
could ultimately be sentenced to death pursuant to the provisions of section
125.30 and 125.35 of the penal law. If the court finds that such a possibility
does not exist, the defendant may as a matter of right enter a plea of guilty
to the indictment. If the court finds that such a possibility does exist, the
defendant may enter a plea of guilty to the indictment only with both the
permission of the court and the consent of the people.
Id
Sections 115.10 and 165.10 were eventually enacted as sections 220.10(3) and
320.10(3), respectively, when the Criminal Procedure Law was enacted in 1970. Act of
May 20, 1970, ch. 996, 1970 N.Y. Laws 3117, 3207, 3229 (effective Sept. 1, 1971).
These provisions were repealed by the 1974 amendments to the capital punishment
law. Act of May 17, 1974, ch. 367, secs. 9, 16, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1209, 1211, 1213; see
supra notes 131, 137-40 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
162- See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
163. The 1974 amendment added the following mandatory sentencing provision to
Penal Law section 60.06: "When a person is convicted of murder in the first degree as
defined in section 125.27, the court shall sentence the defendant to death." Act of
May 17, 1974, ch. 367, sec. 2, § 60.06, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1209, 1209. It also amended
Criminal Procedure Law section 220.10(6)(c) by adding the following language
restricting guilty pleas: "A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of
murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the penal law." Id. sec. 10, §
220.10(6)(c).
164. The sponsor of the 1974 legislation was Dale Volker, then a member of the
Assembly, who was later to serve as the Senate sponsor of New York's post-Gregg
legislation from 1977 until its enactment in 1995. This fact may explain the 1995
statute's utilization of key provisions of the 1974 law. See infra notes 183, 187 and
accompanying text. But see infra notes 166, 190 and accompanying text.
165. Memorandum of Assemblyman Dale M. Volker, A. 11474A, 1974 N.Y. Legis.
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In a letter to the Governor's counsel, however, Volker explained that
the bill was designed to prevent defendants from entering guilty pleas
to first-degree murder:
The purpose is to insure that a jury has heard the case and
determined guilt before capital punishment can be imposed. The
provision gives additional specific protection to the defendant
beyond article 1, §2 of the State Constitution which states that a jury
trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases except
those in which the crime charged may be punishable by death. It
was also felt that allowing a defendant to plead guilty to a capital
offense with the understanding that he could receive a life sentence
only upon a plea of guilty, would run afoul of U.S. v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570 ....
This language supports the premise that protection against state-
sponsored suicide was a traditional goal of both New York's
proscription of guilty pleas and its requirement of jury trials in
potential capital cases, and one that the drafters of the 1974 legislation
sought to preserve. It also suggests that the Legislature's focus in 1974
was to reestablish the death penalty in New York in conformity with
the perceived requirements of Jackson, without endeavoring to
promote plea bargaining in murder cases.
B. The Current New York Death-Penalty Statute
From 1977 through 1994, New York was without a death-penalty
statute. In each of those eighteen years the Legislature passed capital
punishment legislation only to have it vetoed by the Governor.167
Although Governors Hugh Carey and Mario Cuomo proposed
alternative legislation every year providing for life imprisonment
without parole, this legislation was never passed by both houses of the
Legislature.168  Finally, with the election of George Pataki as
Ann. 35. Of course, the legislation also eliminated the two-stage trial process for
determining guilt and sentence in capital cases, as death was now the mandatory
sentence. See supra text accompanying note 131.
166. Letter from Dale M. Volker, Assemblymember, to Michael Whiteman,
Counsel to the Governor (May 14, 1974) (on file with author). The authors wish to
thank Hon. Albert Tomei for bringing this letter to our attention.
167. See infra note 168 (listing Disapproval Memoranda). For an interesting socio-
political analysis of this history, see Franklin E. Zimring, The Wages of Ambivalence:
On the Context and Prospects of New York's Death Penalty, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 303, 309-
18 (1996).
168. See Governor Carey's Disapproval Memoranda: No. 20, 1977 N.Y. Legis. Ann.
351; No. 2, 1978 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 426; No. 70, 1979 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 512; No. 1, 1980
N.Y. Legis. Ann. 406-07; No. 2, 1981 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 547-49; No. 189, 1982 N.Y.
Legis. Ann. 300-01; see also Governor Cuomo's Disapproval Memoranda: No. 1, 1983
N.Y. Legis. Ann. 426; No. 1, 1984 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 355; No. 4, 1985 N.Y. Legis. Ann.
338; No. 1, 1986 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 374; No. 1, 1987 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 302; No. 5, 1988
N.Y. Legis. Ann. 324; No. 1, 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 345; No. 1, 1990 N.Y. Legis. Ann.
466-67; No. 1, 1991 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 426; No. 8, 1992 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 564-65; No. 1,
1993 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 579; and No. 2, 1994 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 544-45.
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Governor in 1995, New York once again enacted a capital-punishment
law,169 redefining murder in the first degree,'7" for which the potential
punishments of either death or life without parole are both available.
1. Guided Discretion in Lieu of Mandatory Sentencing Provisions
New York's new statute gives the district attorney the exclusive and
unreviewable discretion to decide whether or not to seek the death
penalty in any case of first-degree murder.'7' The prosecutor has 120
days after arraignment on an indictment charging first-degree murder
to give the defendant notice of the intention to seek the death penalty,
with timely notice being a precondition of the defendant's eligibility to
receive a death sentence.'P Notice may be withdrawn at any time, but
once retracted, may not be refiled.'"
In contrast to the mandatory death-sentence requirements of its
1974 counterpart, the new statute adopts procedures for determining
sentence approved by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia74 and
its companion case of Proffitt v. Florida,17" including having the jury
weigh aggravating factors 76 against mitigating factors" to resolve the
169. Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1.
170. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27 (McKinney Supp. 2001). Essential elements of the
crime include that the defendant be over eighteen years old, act with intent to kill, kill
the person intended or another person, and that one of twelve statutorily-defined
aggravating circumstances be present. Id.
171. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250A0 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
172. New York Criminal Procedure Law section 250.40(2) provides:
In any prosecution in which the people seek a sentence of death, the people
shall, within one hundred twenty days of the defendant's arraignment upon
an indictment charging the defendant with murder in the first degree, serve
upon the defendant and file with the court in which the indictment is
pending a written notice of intention to seek the death penalty. For good
cause shown the court may extend the period for service and filing of the
notice.
Id § 250.4O(2).
173. Id. § 250.40(4).
174. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
175. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
176. The aggravating factors to be weighed at the sentencing proceeding are
entirely statutory and comprise the twelve aggravating elements of the crime of first-
degree murder under Penal Law section 125.27. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(3)
(McKinney Supp. 2001).
177. Subdivision 9 of section 400.27 contains a list of five statutory mitigating
factors, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(9)(a)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 2001), and also
adds a catchall provision allowing proof of "[any other circumstance concerning the
crime, the defendant's state of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or the
defendant's character, background or record that would be relevant to mitigation or
punishment for the crime." Id. § 400.27(9)(f). This provision is slightly more
expansive than the mitigation requirement which the Supreme Court found mandated
by the Eighth Amendment in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586. 604 (1978) (requiring
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death").
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sentencing decision.7 ' A bifurcated process reminiscent of the 1963
law is established, separating the jury's determination as to guilt or
innocence from its sentencing decision. The narrowing function
required to eliminate the arbitrariness condemned in Furman v.
Georgia179 is essentially accomplished through the jury's verdict at
trial, convicting or acquitting the defendant of the aggravated
elements of the murder charge. In the second phase, or sentencing
proceeding, the jury engages in the individualized sentencing required
by Woodson v. North Carolina8 ' and Roberts v. Louisiana'8' to arrive
at its decision."n
2. Waiver of Jury Trial
The 1995 legislation effected no change in the 1974 statutory
prohibition on bench trials in first-degree murder cases, despite the
fact that death is no longer the exclusive, mandatory sentence for first-
degree murder.'83 In view of the modifications made to the 1974
statute's absolute prohibition on guilty pleas in first-degree murder
178. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2001). Before it may
return a sentence of death, the jury must engage in a two-step process. It must first
determine unanimously, and beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravating factors
substantially outweigh mitigating factors, and second, it must also decide unanimously
that the death penalty should be imposed. Id. § 400.27(11).
179. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
180. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
181. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
182. The judge generally has no power to override the jury's determination. Where
the court holds a hearing and determines that the defendant is mentally retarded,
however, the court may set aside a death sentence and impose a sentence of either life
without parole, or an indeterminate term of incarceration with a minimum of twenty
to twenty-five years and a maximum of life in prison. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §
400.27(12)(c), (e) (McKinney Supp. 2001). In the event that the jury is unable to
reach unanimous agreement on either a sentence of life without parole or a sentence
of death, the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of incarceration with a
minimum term of twenty to twenty-five years and a maximum term of life in prison.
See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(10) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
183. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10(1) (McKinney Supp. 2001); supra note 143.
People v. Elliott, 173 Misc. 2d 795, 662 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).
addressed the inconsistency thus created by having the statute, but not the
Constitution, ban bench trials in non-capital first-degree murder cases. There the
court noted that through its utilization of the notice-of-intent provision of Criminal
Procedure Law section 250.40, the 1995 statute contemplates a class of non-capital
first-degree murder cases that clearly did not exist at the time the 1974 mandatory
death sentence provisions were enacted for first-degree murder. Acknowledging that
Article I, section 2 of the Constitution gives defendants the right to waive a jury in all
cases, except where a death sentence is possible, and recognizing that the purpose of
the constitutional provision is to protect the defendant from imposition of the
ultimate punishment by a single governmental official, the court held that once death
has been removed from the case pursuant to section 250.40, there is no logical or
constitutional reason not to allow the defendant to opt for a non-jury trial. See also
Peter Preiser, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10,
at 496 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
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cases discussed below, the failure to amend the parallel jury waiver
provision must be deemed inadvertent." 4
3. Availability of Guilty Pleas
The 1995 law places unique restrictions on the ability of the
defendant to plead guilty. The blanket prohibition against guilty pleas
to the crime of first-degree murder, enacted in 1974 as part of the
mandatory death-penalty scheme New York passed in response to
Furman, was reinstituted, but with a proviso reminiscent of the 1963
law. Under the terms of these new provisions, a defendant charged
with murder in the first degree cannot enter a plea of guilty to the
entire indictment as of right,ss and may plead guilty to a charge of
murder in the first degree only with the permission of the court and
the consent of the prosecution, and only when the agreed sentence is a
term of imprisonment. 86 The requirement that the plea be entered
with the permission of the court and the consent of the people
pertains despite the fact that death would not be a possible sentence
in the case at the time of the plea entry."
184. See supra note 163 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 185-
87. The court in People v. Elliott found that the Legislature's failure to amend section
320.10(1) to conform to the new statutory scheme was "'inadvertent." Elliott, 173
Misc. 2d at 799, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
185. Cf. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 220.10(2) & (5), 220.60(1) (McKinney Supp.
2001) (making this right available to all other criminal defendants).
186. Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, sec. 10, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1, 4 (amending New York
Criminal Procedure law section 220.10(5)(e), dealing with a plea of guilty to entire
indictment); id. sec. 11 (amending New York Criminal Procedure Law section
220.30(3)(b)(vii), dealing with a plea of guilty to part of indictment). Those sections
provide:
A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of murder in the first
degree as defined in section 125.27 of the penal law; provided, however, that
a defendant may enter such a plea with both the permission of the court and
the consent of the people when the agreed upon sentence is either life
imprisonment without parole or a term of imprisonment for the class A-I
felony of murder in the first degree other than a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole.
Id. sec. 10 (emphasis omitted).
187. By retaining the language of the 1974 law prohibiting a guilty plea "to the
crime of murder in the first degree," id., the 1995 statute's plea provisions created a
problem analogous to its bench trial proscription. See supra note 183. In requiring
prosecutorial consent to the defendant's entry of a guilty plea to non-capital first-
degree murder, the 1995 statute re-instituted an exception to New York's century-old
policy that a defendant charged with any non-capital crime could plead guilty to the
entire indictment as of right. The right to plead guilty where death was not a possible
sentence had been available in New York consistently since 1897, with the sole
exception of the brief period from 1963 to 1970. when the consent of the court and
prosecutor were preconditions to guilty pleas in first-degree murder cases,
notwithstanding the fact that the potential sentence was life imprisonment. See supra
notes 149-66 and accompanying text. In 1970. as previously noted, the Legislature
adopted the Temporary Commission's recommendation. See supra notes 159-60 and
accompanying text. This recommendation was designed to afford greater
opportunities for murder case defendants to plead guilty. It does so by allowing
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The 1995 statute itself generated minimal legislative history. Owing
perhaps to New York's eighteen-year legislative debate on the relative
merits of capital punishment and life without parole, only a single day
was devoted to the debate of the measure in the Legislature, and only
three brief memoranda were generated in support of the bill. 88 In
none of these sources, however, is there any evidence that United
States v. Jackson"8 9 was ever considered by the drafters.190
The new statute thus continues New York's century-old
proscription of guilty pleas where a death sentence is possible, while
permitting them where death is not a possible sentence and the
permission of the court and consent of the prosecutor are obtained.
By utilizing the language of the 1974 mandatory death-penalty law,
however, the current provision departs from its 1970 precursor,
foreclosing a guilty plea in a non-capital first-degree murder case as of
right and requiring prosecutorial consent in every instance. Although
the new law's reliance on the parallel provision of the 1974 statute's
similarly restrictive jury trial requirement has met with judicial
opposition, 9' the guilty plea provisions requiring prosecutorial
consent, even where the possibility of death has been removed from
the case, do not lend themselves to similar judicial repeal, given the
express requirement of prosecutorial consent. In addition, the
determination of death eligibility in each case, which, under the 1970
law, lay with the court and could trigger the right of the defendant to
plead guilty,' 92 now rests exclusively with the prosecutor. 93
defendants, without any prosecutorial involvement, to enter guilty pleas as of right
upon the court's determination that the case is not potentially capital. See supra note
160 (discussing New York Criminal Procedure Law sections 220.10(3) and 320.10(3),
in effect between 1971 and 1974). The 1995 law reverts to the more restrictive
prosecutorial consent requirements of 1963, and extends them to bar guilty pleas as of
right, even where death is eliminated from the case by operation of law due to a
prosecutor's failure to file a timely notice of intent pursuant to New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 250.40, and even where the prosecutor never entertains the
possibility of seeking a death sentence. See Preiser, supra note 183, § 320.10, at 193-94.
188. See N.Y.S. Assembly 1995 Codes Committee Bill Memorandum, A. 4843, S.
2850 (Mar. 6, 1995); Memorandum of New York State Executive Department, 1995
N.Y. Laws 1777 (Mar. 7, 1995); New York State Senate Memorandum in Support
(Revised), S. 2649; see also Record of Proceedings, New York State Assembly, Bill
No. 4843 (Mar. 6, 1995); New York State Senate Death Penalty Debate, Bill No. 2850
(Mar. 6, 1995).
189. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
190. The failure to include even a mention of Jackson is surprising, given its
consideration by the same legislative sponsor during the drafting of New York's 1974
law. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. It is unclear whether this
omission was inadvertent or reflected a belief by the drafters of the 1995 law that the
Supreme Court's post-Jackson decisions on plea bargaining had eliminated the
concerns which the Court had expressed in Jackson, see supra Part II.D, and with
which the Assembly had concerned itself in 1974. See Zimring, supra note 167; supra
text accompanying note 167.
191. See supra note 183.
192. See supra notes 139, 160 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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The new framework revives the concept utilized in New York's
1963 statute, enacted prior to Jackson, of permitting guilty pleas only
on consent of the court and prosecutor and only with a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment.1" A product of New York's cycle of
choosing and then rejecting mandatory death sentences, the 1995 law
also incorporates the state's protective policies prohibiting defendants
from unilaterally resolving their cases by choosing a death sentence, as
well as from receiving a death sentence imposed by a single judge. In
view of New York's constitutional prohibition of bench trials in
capital cases,195 New York's 1995 death-penalty law thus permits a
defendant to be sentenced to death only after a trial by jury.
Although the statute itself does not clearly reveal the purposes
behind this limitation, the constraint apparently serves two separate
and legitimate goals. First, the statute seeks to insure that death
sentences will be imposed only upon a jury's determination to do so.
Second, the statute incorporates New York's century-old protective
policy of preventing defendants from condemning themselves to
death, by prohibiting guilty pleas where death is a potential
sentence.196
C. Early Responses to the Jackson Problem Created By
the Current Statute
In 1998, in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei,1' the New York Court of
Appeals held the new plea provisions9" to be violative of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, relying principally on the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Jackson. In doing so, the Court reversed
declaratory judgments of two intermediate appellate courts that had
found the sections to be compliant with Jackson and its progeny,
resolving a heated controversy among the lower courts.'9
In rejecting the defendant's Jackson argument, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei"'I had
194. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 135.
196. See supra notes 149-66 and accompanying text.
197. 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1998), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1015 (1999).
198. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp.
2001); see supra note 186.
199. Trial courts had split on the issue. Compare People v. Mateo, No. 914196, slip.
op. (Monroe County Ct. 1997) (holding plea provisions unconstitutional), and People
v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997) (same),
with People v. Gatti, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 4, 1998, at 21 (Monroe County Ct. 1998)
(upholding the constitutionality of the provisions), People v. Shulman, N.Y. LJ., Dec.
4, 1997, at 25 (Suffolk County Ct. 1997) (same), People v. McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d 727,
662 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Dutchess County Ct. 1997) (same), and People v. Chinn, N.Y. LJ.,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 1 (Onondaga County Ct. 1996) (same).
200. 237 A.D.2d 52, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1997), rev'd, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706
N.E.2d 1201, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
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distinguished the Federal Kidnaping Act from New York's death-
penalty statute based upon the federal law's provision of a unitary
trial of guilt and punishment. This provision allowed the defendant to
unilaterally avoid the death penalty, in contrast to New York's
bifurcated trial and sentencing proceedings. Under the bifurcated
process, the court reasoned, the defendant could insist on a jury trial
at the guilt phase, and agree to a sentence after exercising the rights to
maintain innocence and have a jury determine guilt. The Appellate
Division also relied upon the Supreme Court's post-Jackson decision
in Brady v. United States,20 1 which upheld a guilty plea under the
Federal Kidnaping Act in the face of a Jackson challenge.
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Matter of Relin v.
Connell,2' distinguished Jackson on the ground that the New York
statute required the defendant to obtain the permission of the court
and consent of the prosecutor before pleading guilty, while the
Federal Kidnaping Act did not require the prosecutor's consent.
According to the court, which also relied upon Brady and Corbitt v.
New Jersey2 3 for its holding, this difference prevented the New York
first-degree murder defendant from unilaterally pleading guilty,
thereby eliminating any potential for coercion occasioned by a choice
between proceeding to jury trial and risking death, on the one hand,
and pleading guilty and avoiding death, on the other.2
D. The New York Court of Appeals' Decision in
Matter of Hynes v. Tomei
Hynes and Connell were consolidated for appeal by the New York
Court of Appeals which, reversing them both, held that the New York
provisions shared the same constitutional defect as the federal
kidnaping and robbery acts: two maximum penalties existed for the
crime at issue, and "by statutory mandate, the death penalty [hung]
over only those who exercise[d] their constitutional rights to maintain
innocence and demand a jury trial."2 5 Rejecting the reasoning of the
Appellate Division decisions, the Court held that bifurcation does not
eliminate the "chilling effect" on a defendant's exercise of these
constitutional rights, which effect the Court found to have been
created by the statutory framework itself. The Court stated: "Capital
defendants under the New York statute who are awaiting trial and are
201. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
202. 251 A.D.2d 1041, 674 N.Y.S.2d 192 (4th Dep't 1998), rev'd sub nom. Matter of
Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1998), cert.
denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
203. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
204. Connell, 251 A.D.2d at 1041, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
205. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 626, 706 N.E.2d at 1207, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The Court
found that only New York, among the thirty-nine death-penalty jurisdictions,
provides for two different maximum punishments, one of which is death. Id. at 620
n.1, 706 N.E.2d at 1203 n.1, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 179 n.1.
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offered a plea are still faced with the choice Jackson declared
unconstitutional: exercise Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and risk
death, or abandon those rights and avoid the possibility of death."2 '
Furthermore, the Court observed, even after exercising the right to
trial at the guilt phase, a defendant can never be assured that a
prosecutor will agree to a plea bargain and forego a death sentence
once a jury has determined guilt.27
Examining the post-Jackson decision of the Supreme Court in
Brady, the Court explained that Jackson did not establish a new test
for the validity of guilty pleas, but rather prohibited the unnecessary
burdening of a defendant's constitutional rights to remain silent and
demand a jury trial.' s Referring to Brady, Alford,. and Parker,'21 " the
Court noted the Supreme Court's holding that a guilty plea that is in
all other respects voluntary will not be invalidated merely because it
was entered pursuant to a Jackson-violative statute, even if it was
induced by a fear of the death penalty.2 ' The Court cited the
Supreme Court's comment in Jackson that its ruling "hardly implies
that every defendant who enters a guilty plea ... under the Act does
so involuntarily," 12 and noted that in Brady, the Supreme Court had
explained that Jackson neither held that all pleas "encouraged" by the
fear of a possible death sentence were "involuntary," nor that such
"encouraged" pleas are necessarily invalid. '3 Absent other signs of
involuntariness, the Court of Appeals reasoned, Brady's affirmance of
a guilty plea under the Federal Kidnaping Act involved a mere
application of the traditional Boykin v. Alabama1 4 standards that
guilty pleas be both "voluntary" and "intelligent" to be valid, and
established that review of Jackson-violative pleas would be done on a
case-by-case basis. 15
The Court of Appeals similarly rejected the notion that the
interposition of the prosecutor in New York's plea-bargaining process
eliminated the constitutional defect. First of all, the Court noted that
judicial approval was required on the pleas under the Federal
Kidnaping Act, and in any case, "the statute's infirmity was not
coercion of guilty pleas and jury waivers but needless encouragement
206. Id. at 626,706 N.E.2d at 1207,684 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
207. This situation has occurred twice since the Court of Appeals' decision. See
People v. Bonton, No. 4152198 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Apr. 6, 2000); People v. Page,
No. 9833/96 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Oct. 28, 1998); infra text accompanying notes 286-
89.
208. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 623 n.3, 706 N.E.2d at 1205 n.3,684 N.Y.S.2d at 181 n.3.
209. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
210. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
211. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 623 n.3, 706 N.E.2d at 1205 n.3,684 N.Y.S.2d at 181 n.3.
212- United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968); see Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 623,
706 N.E.2d at 1205,684 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
213. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970).
214. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
215. Id. at 242-43.
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of them. ' 216  Additionally, the Court noted that in Atkinson the
Supreme Court had reversed five death sentences imposed under the
North Carolina statute on Jackson grounds, attaching no
constitutional significance whatsoever to the fact that the North
Carolina law required acceptance of the plea by both the court and
the prosecutor.2 17  The Court of Appeals concluded that the
constitutional infirmity lay in New York's statutory scheme itself and
the evil was that Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were
impermissibly burdened by the possibility of a death sentence,
resulting in the needless encouragement of pleas.z 8
Considering the appropriate remedy for this constitutional defect,
the Court of Appeals declined the defendants' invitation to invalidate
the entire statute, citing its severability provision.1 9  While
acknowledging that the Supreme Court had stricken only the death-
penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnaping Act at issue in Jackson
and Pope v. United States,220 the Court similarly rejected the
defendants' request to strike the death-sentence provisions of the New
York statute.221  The Court found a significant difference in the
underlying purposes of the two legislative measures, noting that
Congress had appended the death penalty to the federal measure as
an afterthought, while New York lawmakers were motivated
principally by a desire to restore capital punishment in their state.
The Court of Appeals thus viewed the excising of the death-penalty
portions of the act as tantamount to eviscerating "the very purpose of
the Legislature and Governor in enacting the statute. '22
The Court further declared it unnecessary to strike the statute's
capital-punishment provisions in order to satisfy Jackson's mandate,
as two alternative avenues remained for compliance with Jackson.
Either defendants who plead guilty to first-degree murder could be
made eligible for a death sentence, or guilty pleas to first-degree
murder could be entirely prohibited whenever death is a possible
216. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 623, 706 N.E.2d at 1205, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 181 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 624, 706 N.E.2d at 1205, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
218. Id. at 623, 626, 706 N.E.2d at 1205, 1207, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 181, 183.
219. Id. at 628, 706 N.E.2d at 1208, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 184 (citing L. 1995, ch. 1, § 37).
220. 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
221. The same remedy was employed in the North Carolina cases discussed earlier,
see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text, as well as in the more recent state court
decisions upon which the Court of Appeals relied in Hynes. See Commonwealth v.
Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 470 N.E.2d 116 (1984); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436
P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 595 A.2d 498 (1991); State v.
Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55 (1972), cert. denied sub nom. New Jersey v. Presha,
408 U.S. 942 (1972); State v. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 627 P.2d 922 (1981).
Although the Hynes Court characterized these state cases as having invalidated
"capital plea provisions," Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 626-27, 706 N.E.2d at 1207, 684
N.Y.S.2d at 183, each in fact employed the Jackson Court's remedy of striking the
death-penalty provisions, leaving the plea provisions intact.
222. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 628, 706 N.E.2d at 1208, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
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sentence in the case.' As the New York statutory scheme
established that only a jury could impose a death sentence, yet
afforded no avenue for impaneling a jury to determine sentence upon
a defendant's guilty plea, 4 the Court chose the latter course. It
declared that "excision of the capital pleading provisions eliminates
the burden on constitutional rights prohibited by Jackson, since
without those provisions there is only one maximum penalty for first
degree murder."'  The Court summarized its holding by stating:
Thus, while a defendant may not plead guilty to first degree murder
while a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is pending, plea
bargaining to lesser offenses even when a notice of intent is pending,
or to first degree murder in the absence of a notice of intent,
remains unaffected. 226
While predicting that pleas in first-degree murder cases would now be
more difficult to obtain, the Hynes Court did not further define when
a notice of intent would be deemed to be "pending."'
While the Court felt itself bound by Jackson, it also observed that
the case had not received the Supreme Court's attention for some
twenty years and, the Court acknowledged, might be decided
differently today given the changes in the Supreme Court's attitudes
toward plea bargaining and the death penalty.' Despite the clear
opportunity that Hynes presented for the Supreme Court's use of New
York's unique statute to announce its current view of Jackson, the
Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in the case.-
E. Early New York Trial-Court Responses to
Matter of Hynes v. Tomei
Before the New York Court of Appeals decided Matter of Hynes v.
Tomei, plea bargaining in first-degree murder cases in New York was
shaped largely by whether the death penalty remained a possibility in
the case. Where the prosecution had no intention of seeking a death
sentence, plea agreements almost invariably involved parole-eligible
sentences because defendants had little incentive to accept life
without parole in a plea bargain when that was the maximum sentence
they faced after trial. The Court of Appeals' holding had little effect
on plea negotiations in those cases.
223. Id. at 628-29, 706 N.E.2d at 1208-09, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 184-85.
224. Id. at 629 n.7, 706 N.E.2d at 1208-09 n.7, 684 N.Y.S2d at 184-85 n.7 (citing
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27 (McKinney 1993)).
225. Id. at 628,706 N.E.2d at 1208,684 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
226. Id. at 630,706 N.E.2d at 1209,684 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
227. See id. at 629-30, 706 N.E.2d at 1209, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 185; supra note 16
(noting the open questions of what constitutes "pending" under Hynes).
228. Id. at 629,706 N.E.2d at 1209, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
229. Hynes v. Tomei, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999) (denying certiorari).
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By contrast, when plea negotiations were conducted while the
possibility of a death sentence was still in the case-either because the
prosecutor had filed a statutory notice of intent or because the time to
do so had not yet expired3°-a guilty plea carrying a promised
sentence of life without parole was a more likely outcome. In those
cases, just as defendants bargained to avoid exposure to the death
penalty, prosecutors often bargained to foreclose the possibility of
parole. In such situations, the presence of a possible death sentence
provided a powerful incentive for defendants to agree to plead guilty.
At first blush, plea bargaining in those cases seemed to have been
dramatically affected by the Court of Appeals' holding-sometimes to
the substantial dismay of both sides.
In Hynes, after striking the two plea-bargaining provisions,n2 the
Court wrote that "[u]nder the resulting statute, a defendant may not
plead guilty to first degree murder while a notice of intent to seek the
death penalty is pending. '' n2 A less-heralded, but no less important,
consequence of the holding was the elimination of the only statutory
requirement that a guilty plea to first-degree murder have the
prosecutor's consent. 3 The elimination of that requirement left only
the general New York rule that a prosecutor's consent was necessary
when a plea was offered to less than all pending charges,2 - but not
when the defendant's guilty plea embraced the entire indictment. 2"
In this post-Hynes v. Tomei environment, prosecutors and
defendants in capital cases continued their attempts to chart a course
to successful plea bargaining for life sentences in lieu of potential
capital punishment, whether or not a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty had as yet been filed in the case. Where the prosecutors had
not yet announced a decision on death eligibility, and defendants
would offer the court a guilty plea to the entire indictment without the
prosecutors' knowledge or consent, the proffers would be rejected.
Where a notice of intent had been filed, and prosecutors and
defendants would join forces in seeking court approval of their plea
bargain, the parties generally would receive court approval of the
negotiated disposition of a life-without-parole sentence.
230. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.40 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
231. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 629, 706 N.E.2d at 1208, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 184 (striking N.
Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii)).
232- Id. at 629, 706 N.E.2d at 1208-09, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 184-85.
233. Both of the statutes that were stricken prohibited guilty pleas to the crime of
murder in the first degree, but contained the identical proviso "that a defendant may
enter such a plea with both the permission of the court and the consent of the people
when the agreed upon sentence" is other than death. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§
220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 2001); see supra notes 186-87 and
accompanying text.
234. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 220.10(4) (McKinney 1993).
235. See id. § 220.10(2).
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1. Defendants' Unilateral Plea Efforts
In the first example of a defendant's unilateral plea-bargaining
effort after Hynes, Dutchess County, New York defendant Kendall
Francois attempted to use the general rule on pleading guilty as of
right to the entire indictment to secure a sentence of life without
parole and shield himself from exposure to the death penalty."
Francois stood indicted, inter alia, on eight counts of first-degree
murder. Following his arraignment, his lawyers began negotiating
with prosecutors in an attempt to persuade them not to seek the death
penalty and to allow the defendant to plead guilty with a promised
sentence of life without parole."  Negotiations had not gone well,
however, and on December 21, 1998, one day before the release of the
Court of Appeals' decision in Hynes, defense counsel was notified that
statutory notice of intent to seek the death penalty would be filed in
early January, well within the 120-day time limit.'
On December 23, 1998, however, defense counsel came to court
and, citing the Court of Appeals' newly-announced decision,
demanded that the defendant's case be advanced so that he could
plead guilty to the entire indictment. Counsel offered a three-pronged
argument: (1) after Hynes, the defendant had the right to plead guilty
to the entire indictment, including the eight counts of first-degree
murder, without the prosecutor's consent; (2) the defendant's
proposed guilty pleas to the first-degree murder counts could be
accepted consistent with the Court of Appeals' holding because,
having not yet been filed, the promised statutory notice of intent was
not then "pending;" and (3) because a death sentence could not be
imposed in the absence of a notice of intent, --9 the maximum sentence
the defendant faced on each count of murder in the first degree was
life without parole.2"
The trial court rejected both the argument and the guilty plea. The
court reasoned that to do otherwise would require holding that the
Court of Appeals had implicitly rendered meaningless the statute
giving the prosecution 120 days within which to file and serve a notice
of intent to seek the death penalty. 41 Moreover, finding that the
meaning of the word "pending" included "awaiting an occurrence,"
the court held that, when the plea was proffered, a notice of intent was
indeed "pending" even though none had yet been filed.242 The court
concluded that a defendant could plead guilty to first-degree murder
only if the prosecutor (1) had failed to file a notice of intent within 120
236. People v. Francois, N.Y. .. , Feb. 17, 1999, at 38 (Dutchess County Ct. 1999).
237. Id.
238. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.40(2) (McKinney Supp. 2001): supra note 172.
239. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.40(1) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
240. Francois, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 17, 1999, at 38.
241. Id
242. Id (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6thed. 1990)).
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days of the defendant's arraignment on the indictment, (2) had
affirmatively announced that the death penalty would not be sought,
or (3) had withdrawn a previously-filed notice of intent.243
Francois then brought a proceeding in the Appellate Division of the
State Supreme Court under article 78 of New York's Civil Practice
Law and Rules seeking a judgment in the nature of mandamus or
prohibition compelling the trial court to accept his guilty plea. The
Appellate Division, Second Department, denied the petition and
dismissed the proceeding without reaching the merits, finding that the
petitioner lacked any clear legal right to have the trial court accept his
plea.24
In a second such case, People v. Schroedel,2 5 the defendant's
motion to plead guilty to the entire indictment under the general plea
provisions without prosecutorial consent, and before the expiration of
the 120-day period for filing a notice of intent, met a similar fate. The
trial judge denied the motion, finding that the notice-of-intent
provision" effectively stayed the defendant's rights under the general
plea provisions, preventing the defendant from pleading guilty until
the prosecutor either declined to file a notice of intent, consented to
the entry of the plea, or was time-barred from seeking the death
penalty in the case.247
Schroedel also sought to compel the trial court to accept the plea by
seeking relief in the nature of mandamus. The Appellate Division,
Third Department, rejected the defendant's interpretation of the
"pendency" of a death notice under Hynes, holding that that concept
should include both the period after the filing of a notice and the 120-
day window within which the People have the right to file it?48
Otherwise, the court reasoned, the purpose underlying the death-
penalty statute would be defeated, as the defendant, not the
prosecutor, would determine death eligibility in a particular case.249
Noting the dearth of authority on the question, the appellate court
followed the Second Department's holding in Matter of Francois v.
Dolan"0 and found the claim barred due to the absence of a legal right
to have the plea accepted2 1
The New York Court of Appeals, however, soon eliminated the
uncertainty. Upon reviewing Francois' petition for mandamus or
243. Id.
244. Matter of Francois v. Dolan, 263 A.D.2d 483, 693 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't
1999).
245. 182 Misc. 2d 154, 697 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sullivan County Ct. 1999).
246. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.40 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
247. Schroedel, 182 Misc. 2d at 157,697 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
248. Matter of Schroedel v. LaBuda, 264 A.D.2d 136, 138, 707 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253
(3d Dep't 2000).
249. Id.
250. 263 A.D.2d 483, 693 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1999).
251. Schroedel, 264 A.D.2d at 138-39, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
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prohibition, the Court of Appeals affirmed the intermediate appellate
court and rejected the defendant's argument that the general guilty-
plea provisions created an unqualified right to plead guilty in first-
degree murder cases. z In Francois, the court held that
until the completion of the statutorily provided deliberative process,
either by the filing of a death penalty notice, announcement of an
intention not to seek that sanction, or by the expiration of the
statutory period to make that decision, a capital defendant does not
have an unqualified right to plead guilty to the entire indictment.-5'
The court went on to hold that in any conflict between the New York
Criminal Procedure Law's general plea provisions of sections
220.10(2) and 220.60(2), on the one hand, and the death-penalty
notice provision of section 250.40, on the other, the latter provision
would prevail.' Examining the legislative history of the 1995 death-
penalty legislation, the unanimous court characterized the
"prosecutorial authority [to exercise the right to seek the death
penalty] and the statutory time frame for its exercise" as "central
feature[s] of the bill'"" which would be upended if a defendant could
unilaterally eliminate the possibility of a death sentence from the case.
The court reiterated that its ruling in Hynes prohibited capital
defendants from pleading guilty as of right to avoid a sentence of
death, suggesting that the defendant's application was clearly barred
under the principles of Jackson and Hynes.--  Decrying the
"inevitabl[e]" and "unseemly race to the courthouse" which would
ensue if defendants could unilaterally decapitalize first-degree murder
cases by proffering guilty pleas, the court dismissed the petition on the
merits, without addressing the procedural hurdles which the lower
courts had viewed as bars to relief.-
2. Prosecutors' and Defendants' Joint Plea Efforts
Most of the litigation spawned by Hynes has grown out of plea
negotiations conducted after a statutory notice of intent has been
filed. Prosecutors quickly came to believe that withdrawal of the
notice prior to the guilty plea undermined much of their plea-
bargaining leverage. This was so, they reasoned, because the statutory
provision that "[o]nce withdrawn the notice of intent to seek the death
penalty may not be refiled" 8 suggested that withdrawal of the notice
took the death penalty out of the case forever.
252. Matter of Francois v. Dolan, 95 N.Y.2d 33, 37. 731 N.E.2d 614, 616, 709
N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (2000).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 38, 731 N.E.2d at 617,709 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
256. Id. at 36-38, 731 N.E.2d at 615-16, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900.
257. Id. at 39, 731 N.E.2d at 617, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
258. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.40(4) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
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Prosecutors feared that, as a consequence of withdrawing the notice
of intent, defendants who had agreed to plead guilty and accept life
without parole to avoid a potential death sentence would suddenly
lose all incentive to enter the plea. The open invitation to defendants
to renege on plea agreements made prosecutors less willing to enter
them. As a result, when both sides expressed genuine interest in a
plea bargain involving life without parole, the parties searched for
new ways to give prosecutors meaningful assurances against last-
minute renunciations.
In one case, the prosecutor sought such an assurance through a
"conditional" withdrawal. In People v. Van Dyne, 9 both the
prosecution and defense presented applications to the court to permit
the defendant to plead guilty and receive a sentence of life without
parole. The defendant signed a written plea agreement and colloquy,
and acknowledged under oath his guilt of the crime, his waiver of
Boykin rights 6' and his right to appeal, his awareness of the Hynes
decision, and that he was pleading guilty for four reasons: 1) he was
remorseful; 2) he wished to spare his family and the victim's family the
ordeal of a trial; 3) he was aware of the strength of the People's case;
and 4) he did not wish to face the death penalty.2 61
The prosecutor withdrew his section 250.40 notice but "specifically
condition[ed] the withdrawal of the notice of intent to seek the death
penalty upon the entry of a plea of guilty [to first-degree murder] and
reserve[d] the right to reinstate the notice if the plea is not entered or
is withdrawn. ' 261 The defendant, having previously offered to plead
guilty and accept a sentence of life without parole, and having given a
full allocution, immediately asked the court to accept his plea. The
court did so, holding that "the plea may be accepted based upon the
defendant's knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of rights and
consistent with the recent decision of the Court of Appeals."2 63 As the
court immediately entered the plea, the viability of the prosecutor's
purported conditional withdrawal of the death eligibility notice was
never tested.
In People v. Edwards, prior to the Court of Appeals' decision in
Hynes, the defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in
exchange for a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison. In
Edwards, the trial court, citing Jackson, refused to accept a plea to
first-degree murder where the notice of intent to seek the death
259. 179 Misc. 2d 467, 685 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Monroe County Ct. 1999).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
261. Van Dyne, 179 Misc. 2d at 468-69, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93.
262. Id. at 469, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
263. Id. at 470, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
264. 180 Misc. 2d 564, 690 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Schoharie County Ct. 1999), rev'd, 274
A.D.2d 754, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d Dep't 2000).
2354 [Vol. 69
2001] PLEA BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH 2355
penalty was not withdrawn until the time of sentencing.b5 The district
attorney then expressly agreed to withdraw the notice of intent at the
plea allocution. The defendant offered his plea allocution upon the
understanding that the notice would be withdrawn immediately
thereafter and would not be refiled, even if the defendant did not
adhere to the terms of the plea agreement or if the court did not
ultimately accept the plea.26  After the defendant's plea allocution
and waiver of his rights to appeal, but prior to the entry of the plea,
the prosecutor withdrew the notice of intent without purporting to
reserve the right to refile it. The trial court then, upon considering the
plea allocution and the withdrawal of section 250.40 notice, accepted
the defendant's guilty plea as intelligent and voluntary and allowed it
to be entered.267
Once the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Hynes, however,
the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of that
decision. The trial court denied the motion, finding no violation of
Hynes, because "when the plea was entered, the notice of intent had
been withdrawn with no conditions attached which would allow for
reinstatement,"2' and since the "plea [was] entered after the notice of
intent was withdrawn, or entered in conjunction with the withdrawal
of the notice of intent, [it] remains valid under the precepts of Matter
of Hynes v. Tomei.' '269 By finding that the plea was entered in the
absence of a notice of intent, the court found that it was made when
only one maximum punishment for the crime was available, whether
by plea or by trial, thus satisfying the requirements of Jackson and
Hynes. Finally, the court rejected the defendant's application for
relief from his plea by reference to the Supreme Court's refusal to
invalidate the otherwise voluntary and intelligent pleas made under
Jackson-violative statutes in Alford, Parker, and Brady, relying on
Alford's instruction that "[t]he prohibitions against involuntary or
unintelligent pleas should not be relaxed, but neither should an
exercise in arid logic render those constitutional guarantees
counterproductive and put in jeopardy the very human values they
were meant to preserve."270
In another case, the court employed the approach used in Edwards
to reject the prosecution's proposal for a "conditional" withdrawal of
the notice of intent, such as that sought in Van Dyne. In People v.
Smelefsky,2 71 the court expressed the view that "a 'conditional'
withdrawal seemed irreconcilable with the unambiguous statutory
265. Id. at 566, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 405-06.
266. Id., 690 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
267. Id. at 566, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
26& Id.
269. Id. at 567, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 406 (citation omitted).
270. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,39 (1970)).
271. 182 Misc. 2d 11,695 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1999).
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provision that '[o]nce withdrawn [a] notice of intent to seek the death
penalty may not be refiled.' '1 7 2  Instead, the court followed the
procedure used in Edwards, allowing the District Attorney to
withhold consent to the plea and withdrawal of the notice of intent
until after the defendant had proffered the plea and had undergone a
full allocution.273 Following the defendant's allocution, the prosecutor
consented to the disposition, withdrew the notice of intent, and joined
the defendant's application to have the court accept the plea. The
court immediately accepted and entered the plea. The court reasoned
that the sequence was not inconsistent with the holding of Hynes, as
no notice of intent was pending when the guilty plea was accepted and
entered, and "it is the acceptance by the court, and not the proffer by
the defendant, that makes a guilty plea cognizable. '' 27 4 And, the court
held, so long as the notice of intent was withdrawn before the plea was
accepted and entered, neither Hynes nor its constitutional
underpinnings were violated 75 Moreover, the court in Smelefsky
opined that the procedure used would facilitate plea bargaining in
capital cases because it "narrowed the window of opportunity for the
defendant to renounce the bargain, [and therefore] fortified the
prosecutor's resolve to go forward with it. 276
Other cases followed a similar approach.2 77 One of them, People v.
Irwin,278 slightly varied the Edwards-Smelefsky procedure in an effort
to afford the prosecution even greater assurance that it would not lose
control of the case during the plea proceedings. There the defendant
made a sworn statement on the record admitting the crime prior to
the plea proceeding. The district attorney then withdrew the notice of
intent, and the defendant repeated her inculpatory statement in her
plea allocution, offering her plea in exchange for a sentence of life
without parole, and on the understanding that her sworn allocution
could be used against her at trial if the plea did not go forward.279 The
People moved to have the plea accepted by the court. Concluding
that this procedure would provide additional protection for the
272. Id. at 14, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 691 (alterations in original) (quoting N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 250.40(4) (McKinney 1993)).
273. Although the prosecutorial-consent requirement of CPL section 220.10(5)(e)
had by then been declared unconstitutional, the District Attorney's consent to the
plea was required because the defendant was pleading guilty to less than the entire
indictment. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 220.10(4)(a) (McKinney 1993).
274. Smelefsky, 182 Misc. 2d at 19, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
275. Id., 695 N.Y.S.2d at 694-95.
276. Id., 695 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
277. E.g., People v. Francois, No. 122/98 (Dutchess County Ct. June 21, 2000)
(following an Edwards-Smelefsky approach in taking defendant's guilty plea to the
entire indictment, including eight counts of first-degree murder, subsequent to the
Court of Appeals' denial of defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus or
prohibition).
278. No. 80-98 (Sullivan County Ct. Sept. 10, 1999).
279. Id.
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prosecutor, the court reviewed the factual allocution and all of the
rights being waived, determined that the defendant's plea was
voluntary and intelligent, and then entered the plea.'
In People v. Hale"'81 the case underlying the Hynes decision, the
trial court was also faced with a joint application for a guilty plea. In
Hale, however, the district attorney was not willing to risk
withdrawing his death notice.m Following the express authorization
in both Hynes' and North Carolina v. Alford,2 while the death
notice continued in effect, the parties in Hale negotiated a plea
agreement under which the defendant pled guilty to second-degree
murder and related charges in exchange for an indeterminate, parole-
eligible life sentence.'
In two other Kings County cases, the parties did not reach a
meeting of the minds on a life-without-parole sentence until after the
defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder by the jury and
was awaiting commencement of the sentencing proceeding. In People
v. Bonton' and People v. Page" trial judges followed identical
procedures in accepting the parties' sentencing agreements. In each
case, the parties jointly approached the court with an agreed
disposition of a life-without-parole sentence while the jury awaited the
start of the penalty phase. In each case, the court received the sworn
allocution of each defendant accepting the jury's guilt phase verdict,
acknowledging his guilt of first-degree murder and the other crimes of
which he had been convicted, waiving his right to appeal all pre-trial,
trial, and sentencing determinations, and acknowledging the sentence
he would be receiving.3 The prosecution then consented to a life-
without-parole sentence, subject to the court's approval, and, in
280. Id. The approach used in Inin certainly makes it easier for the prosecution to
secure a trial conviction if a guilty plea is not entered. In the fourteen capital cases
tried under the 1995 New York law through August 23, 2000, however, no defendant
was acquitted of all first-degree murder charges. See iifra app. As of the time of this
writing, of the sixteen capital defendants tried, only one was acquitted of all first-
degree murder charges, although he was convicted of murder in the second degree.
See People v. Webb, No. 5157/99 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Feb. 8,2001) Oury verdict).
Plea bargaining in capital cases tends to focus more on obtaining the desired sentence
than on securing a determination of guilt. Although an admission in court may
increase the already high likelihood of conviction, it would add relatively little
leverage from the prosecutor's viewpoint in terms of obtaining the desired life-
without-parole sentence. Under Inin, a reneging defendant would suffer relatively
little practical penalty, and so would still have minimal incentive to accept a sentence
of life without parole in a plea bargain, the maximum sentence possible once the
death notice has been withdrawn. Irin, No. 80-98.
281. No. 8776/96 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Jan. 11. 1998).
282. Id. at 11.
283. See supra note 23.
284. 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970).
285. Hale, No. 8776/96, at 5.
286. No. 4152/98 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Apr. 6,2000).
287. No. 9833/96 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Oct. 28, 1998).
288. Bonton, No. 4125/98, at 1898-99; Page, No. 9833/96, at 1899-1900.
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language reminiscent of that used by the district attorney in Van
Dyne, sought to preserve its options by claiming that if either the
jury's guilty verdict of first-degree murder or the agreed upon
sentence, or both, should be vacated, "the filing of the notice pursuant
to 250.40... will stand, survive and serve as a renewed notice of our
intention to retry the Defendant for the charge of murder in the first
degree and or seek the death penalty for the Defendant's present
conviction." 289 The defendant agreed to these terms, executed a
written waiver of the right to appeal, and the court accepted the
proffered disposition. At no point during the procedure did the
prosecution withdraw its death notice.
3. Some Problems with the Early Responses to
Matter of Hynes v. Tomei
These initial judicial efforts to preserve needed plea bargaining
while avoiding the constitutional pitfalls decried in Jackson and Hynes
offered seemingly satisfactory resolutions of capital cases to all
concerned. The defendants avoided any possibility of execution; the
prosecutors obtained certain convictions, most often with attendant
life-without-parole sentences and without the drain on resources that
capital trials entail; and the trial courts resolved cases without
engaging in the time-consuming process of death-qualifying juries and
conducting bifurcated trials. Formal compliance was had with
Jackson's mandate that only one maximum penalty be available for
the crime at the time the guilty plea is entered, so there was no
unnecessary burden on defendants' exercise of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.29° While plea bargaining in New York's capital
cases could hardly be considered business as usual, it seemed as
though Hynes had changed the legal landscape very little.29'
Nevertheless, none of the post-Hynes solutions ultimately proved to
be totally satisfactory. For openers, all of the procedures used in
these early post-Hynes cases fell short of providing complete security
to either party to the transaction. Defendants had to actually
surrender their Fifth Amendment privilege prior to witnessing the
prosecutor withdraw the possibility of a death sentence from the case.
And district attorneys were forced into a window of uncertainty,
however brief, during which they had irrevocably decapitalized the
case but could not be completely sure whether or not the court would
accept the plea bargain.
289. Bonton, No. 4125/98, at 1906.
290. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
291. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Pataki
Administration's Proposals to Expand the Death Penalty, 55 The Record 129, 139-41
(2000).
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More importantly, in none of these early cases was the shadow of
death truly removed from the defendant's decision-making process.
In Van Dyne, Hale, Bonton, and Page, the prosecutors never
completely eliminated defendants' eligibility for the death sentence
from the case, and retained through the plea negotiation and
allocution process at least a claimed ability to reinsert the death
penalty into the case should the proceedings not go as intended. In
Edwards, Snelefsky, Francois, and Irwin, the death penalty was not
finally eliminated from the case until after the defendant made a full
admission of his guilt of a capital-eligible crime in open court, under
oath. While the United States Supreme Court had held in Alford that
the possibility of a death sentence would not, in itself, raise a
constitutional bar to plea bargaining,2 92 as a practical matter the New
York statute was being used to hold the specter of a death sentence
over defendants in order to obtain plea agreements involving the
maximum possible sentence available once death was removed from
the case. Certainly the plea negotiations, plea agreement, and much
of the formal plea process in these cases took place while the
possibility of a death sentence still remained in the case, i.e., while two
maximum penalties existed for the crime of murder in the first degree,
one after trial and one after a guilty plea.
Available empirical evidence strongly suggests that in New York (as
in other death-penalty jurisdictions) the possibility of the death
penalty provides defendants in potentially capital cases with a
substantial incentive to enter into plea bargains that result in the
imposition of life without parole. Although the passage of New
York's capital punishment law in 1995 signaled an end to the
seventeen-year debate over whether the state should adopt a death-
penalty law or a life-without-parole law, the most significant real-
world impact of the law, as of this writing, has been to increase the
incidence of agreements between prosecution and defense that result
in life-without-parole sentences. From September 1, 1995, through
August 23, 2000, there were 212 cases in which first-degree murder
indictments were concluded.2 93 In only thirty-six of the cases did the
prosecution ever file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and
in four of those cases the notice of intent was later withdrawn or
otherwise became irrelevant to the outcome of the case.' Among the
thirty-two defendants against whom a notice of intent was filed, and
for whom the existence of the notice of intent might have affected the
outcome of the case, fourteen defendants (43.8%) eventually agreed
to accept a sentence of life without parole, either as part of a plea
292. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970).
293. See infra app.
294. Id. In three of the cases, the notice of intent was withdrawn prior to case
disposition. In one case, the defendant died before case disposition. hi.
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agreement or in a sentencing agreement after conviction at trial.295
Among the much larger total of 176 defendants against whom no
notice of intent to seek the death penalty was ever filed, on the other
hand, only six defendants (3.4%) agreed to plead guilty and accept a
sentence of life without parole-and all six of those defendants
entered their pleas at a time when the prosecutor could still have filed
a death notice, suggesting at least the possibility of a tacit agreement
to do so and thereby avoid any risk of the death penalty.296 If such
cases also can be counted as "agreement" cases, then more than three
times as many defendants have agreed to accept a sentence of life
without parole (twenty defendants) as have received a death sentence
(six defendants) under the New York statute.29  These statistics
strongly suggest that-even after Hynes, and especially in light of
Francois, which barred defendants in first-degree murder cases from
preempting the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty by
entering unilateral guilty pleas before the filing of a death notice s29 -
plea bargaining in the shadow of death remains a regular practice in
New York, just as it has always been in other death-penalty
jurisdictions.
F. The Third Department's Decision in People v. Edwards
Refuting the notion that all parties to capital case plea bargains
were content with the resolutions they had secured, Daniel Edwards
appealed his plea and sentence of twenty-five years to life, arguing, as
he had in the lower court, that this process transgressed his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights under Jackson and Hynes. The Appellate
Division, Third Department, agreed with him.299
In People v. Edwards, the Third Department reached the merits of
the case, notwithstanding the defendant's waiver of his right to appeal.
The court found that the defendant's waiver of his right to appeal was
neither knowing nor intelligent, due to its entry pursuant to statutory
provisions that were later invalidated."'
Without mentioning Brady v. United States,31' Parker v. North
Carolina,2 or North Carolina v. Alford, °3 and without referencing the
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 252-57.
299. People v. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d 754, 757-58, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71, 75-76 (3d Dep't
2000).
300. Id. at 756, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 74; cf Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57
(1970) (rejecting notion that defendant's guilty plea was unintelligent due to his
failure to anticipate Jackson's striking of the maximum penalty then in effect).
301. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
302. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
303. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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discussion of those cases in either Matter of Hynes v. Tomei -" or the
trial court's decision below,3 5 the Third Department held the plea
procedure used in Edwards unconstitutional:3'
We find this scheme flawed because it overlooks the essence of the
Hynes-Jackson infirmity. That constitutional infirmity arises not
from the entry of a guilty plea to murder in the first degree while a
death notice is pending, but from the requirement placed upon a
defendant to choose between pleading guilty to murder in the first
degree or opting for trial while a death notice is pending. If a
prosecutor who has served a death notice is permitted to delay its
withdrawal until after a defendant's plea allocution, then the choice
to plead guilty has been made under compulsion of the death notice
and a defendant's 5th and 6th Amendment rights have been
impermissibly burdened. In our view, the mere proffer of a plea
bargain to murder in the first degree while a death notice is pending
presents a capital defendant with the same unconstitutional choice
faced by the defendants in Matter of Hynes v Tomei and Matter of
Relin v Connell, namely, "exercise Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights and risk death, or abandon those rights and avoid the
possibility of death." Thus, we find that it is constitutionally
impermissible for prosecutors to negotiate guilty pleas to murder in
the first degree while a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is
pending.0 7
Because the choice to plead guilty to first-degree murder was made
in the shadow of death, the Third Department vacated Edwards'
plea,3 s restored the indictment to its pre-plea status, and, without
comment, reinstated the notice of intent to seek the death penalty,
despite the prosecution's irrevocable withdrawal of the notice at the
time of the plea.
After Edwards, there appears to be little, if any, flexibility for even
discussing plea bargaining in first-degree murder cases-' from the
304. 92 N.Y.2d 613, 624, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1205, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177, 181 (1998), cert.
denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
305. People v. Edwards, 180 Misc. 2d 564, 690 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Schoharie County Ct.
1999), rev'd, 274 A.D.2d 754,712 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d Dep't 2000).
306. Although not before it, the Edwards court also discussed Sinelefsky, a case
from a different judicial department in which a nearly identical plea procedure was
used, and suggested that the Smelefsky procedure was likewvise unconstitutional.
Edwards, 274 A.D.2d at 757,712 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
307. Id. (citations omitted).
308. No claim was advanced in Edwards that the defendant's plea had not been
intelligent or voluntary. See Brady v. United States. 397 U.S. 742 (1970); North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
309. The Edwards court apparently left open the possibility that a defendant faced
with a first-degree murder charge and a death notice might agree to plead guilty to
second-degree murder to avoid the death penalty. Such a plea to second-degree
murder had been explicitly upheld by the Court of Appeals in Hynes, based on the
Hynes Court's interpretation of Alford. See Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 629-30,706 N.E.2d at
1209, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 185. The Edwards court therefore lacked the authority to
prohibit it; moreover, the issue was not presented in Edwards. At the same time, such
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moment a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is filed310 until the
prosecutor has, through action or inaction, completely eliminated the
defendant's death eligibility from the case for all time.311 Thus, in the
view of the Third Department, any plea method that permits a
prosecutor to forbear withdrawing a death notice until after a
defendant has proffered a guilty plea allocution to first-degree
murder, forces the defendant into an unconstitutional choice and is
impermissible under Hynes. 311 Edwards would thus appear to
invalidate all of the dispositional avenues discussed above, with the
possible exception of the avenues that were followed in the sentencing
agreement cases such as Bonton and Page.1 3
a plea would appear to be inconsistent with much of the reasoning in Edwards, since
the defendant would still be pleading guilty-albeit to a lesser crime-in the shadow
of death.
310. As noted previously, see supra note 16, there remains an open question
whether a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is "pending," under Hynes,
during the 120-day period within which the prosecutor has the right to file such a
notice, but before the prosecutor has elected to do so. See People v. Mower, 719
N.Y.S.2d 780 (3d Dep't 2001); People v. Owes, No. 2000-0161 (Monroe County Ct.
Sept. 27, 2000); see also infra Part III.G.
311. The sole exception might be a plea to the lesser crime of second-degree
murder. See supra notes 23,309.
The Third Department's decision will likely be viewed as binding on trial courts
throughout the state until a contrary ruling is issued by the Appellate Division in
another judicial department or by the Court of Appeals. See Mountain View Coach
Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 102 A.D.2d 663, 664-65, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919-20 (2d Dep't
1984). In at least one recent case, however, the ban on plea negotiations while a
notice of intent is pending, announced in Edwards and reaffirmed in Mower, see infra
Part III.G, appears simply to have been ignored. In People v. Schroedel, No. 115/99
(Sullivan County Ct. Apr. 5, 2001), the Irwin procedure was used to obtain a guilty
plea to first-degree murder charges in exchange for a promised sentence of life
without parole, based upon plea negotiations that had occurred during the pendency
of the notice of intent.
312. See Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 684 N.Y.S.2d
177 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
313. See People v. Bonton, No. 4152/98 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Apr. 6, 2000);
People v. Page, No. 9833/96 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Oct. 28, 1998). It must be noted
that in Bonton and Page, the defendants did not enter into the plea agreements that
allowed them to avoid the death penalty until after they had already been found guilty
by a jury. Thus, arguably, the defendants in Bonton and Page did not waive their
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in order to avoid the death penalty; instead, they
received a jury trial, and they were incriminated by the jury's verdict. See Bonton, No.
4152/98; Page, No. 9833/96. Nevertheless, given that the defendants in Bonton and
Page clearly did give up important rights that were closely related to their Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights-namely, the right to appeal their convictions and, if
successful on appeal, the right to have another jury trial at which their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights would reattach-it seems more likely that the Edwards decision
would invalidate the procedure used in Bonton and Page. This conclusion is perhaps
bolstered by the fact that the defendants in Bonton and Page also gave up the right to
have a trial-like capital sentencing procedure, see Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430
(1981). at which they would have continued to enjoy the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination, see Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314
(1999), and at which they also would have had a statutory right to a jury verdict on the
appropriateness of the death penalty.
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Edwards undoubtedly represents an extreme response to the
Jackson-Hynes constitutional infirmity, and a substantial extension of
Hynes. The defendant in Edwards, whose plea was not challenged as
unintelligent or involuntary, who was not claiming innocence, and
who had waived his right to appeal, was given appellate relief from his
plea based upon the burdening of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment trial
rights, which he never sought to exercise." 4 Although Brady had
established that review of Jackson-violative pleas would be done on
an individual basis, and thus allowed for the possibility that a
particular case would require such relief, the Edwards court did not
base its decision on any individual characteristics of the case before it.
The court focused, instead, on what it saw as the empty formalism of
the New York trial courts' post-Hynes plea-allocution procedures in
failing to alleviate the pressure on the defendant of having to make
the choice, while the death notice is still pending, between pleading
guilty to first-degree murder with an ensuing life-without-parole
sentence or opting for trial with the accompanying risk of death. The
Edwards court expressly rejected the procedures used in the case
before it and barred even a preliminary discussion of a plea to first-
degree murder while the "shadow of death" still hangs over the
case.315 And, finally, the decision in Edwards reinstated the death
notice, despite the statutory proscription against its being refiled once
withdrawn, and notwithstanding the District Attorney's agreement at
the time of the plea that the notice would not be refiled, regardless of
whether or not the defendant satisfied his obligations under the plea
agreement.316
What can explain the unexpected result in Edwards? Perhaps it was
the combination of several factors that effectively enlarged the avenue
created by Brady, for guilty pleas in the shadow of an unconstitutional
death penalty, to a grand boulevard down which the Edwards court
simply refused to proceed. These factors include: (1) the unique
environment created by the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
Hynes not to employ the Jackson remedy of striking the death-penalty
provisions of the New York statute;3 7 (2) the Hynes Court's inability
to eliminate plea bargaining in capital cases, due to the circumvention,
314. People v. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d 754. 757-58, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71. 75-76 (3d Dep't
2000).
315. Id, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
316. See People v. Edwards, 180 Misc. 2d 564, 566, 690 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405-06
(Schoharie County Ct. 1999), rev'd, 274 A.D.2d 754,712 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d Dep't 2000).
317. But see State v. Harper, 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968) (utilizing an
approach very similar to Hynes). As evidenced by the Harper Court's attempt to
remedy the Jackson defect in the South Carolina death-penalty scheme by striking
down its plea-bargaining provisions, rather than its death-penalty provisions, the
Hynes Court's choice of remedy was not entirely unique. The issue in South Carolina
became essentially moot shortly thereafter, however, due to the Supreme Court's
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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by creative New York trial judges, of Hynes' attempted proscription
of first-degree-murder pleas while a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty is still present in the case; and (3) the impact of New York's
death-penalty statute (both before and after Hynes) on defendants'
willingness to enter into plea agreements involving life sentences.
Edwards appears to have managed, at least for the time being, to
put teeth (albeit possibly unintended by the Court of Appeals) into
the Hynes decision. Edwards purports to have finally and completely
eliminated plea bargaining to first-degree murder in cases where a
notice of intent to seek death has been filed,3 I8 through its declaration
that "death is different" and its fundamental message that a death-
penalty statute cannot be used, consistently with a defendant's
constitutional rights, as a life-sentence plea-bargaining statute.319
Ironically, however, the Edwards court's protection of capital
defendants' constitutional rights may have the effect of forcing every
defendant to risk death, 320 as its method for eliminating the impact of
the death-penalty statute on capital defendants' guilty pleas would
also jettison the ability of those defendants to avoid the possibility of a
death sentence through plea negotiations. As the Jackson Court
suggested, such an outcome may have a "cruel impact" on those
capital defendants who truly do not wish to contest their guilt.
3 2
'
G. Plea Bargaining Post-Edwards: People v. Owes
and People v. Mower
Two months after the Third Department's ruling in Edwards, at
least one trial court managed to find a way around the limits that
Edwards placed on plea bargaining in capital first-degree murder
cases in New York. In People v. Owes,322 the trial court, making no
reference to Edwards, accepted a guilty plea to murder in the first
degree without ever requiring the prosecutor to make any
318. But see supra notes 16, 310 (discussing the open question whether a notice of
intent is "pending" within the meaning of Hynes during the 120-day period within
which it may be filed by the prosecutor, but before it has been so filed).
319. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d at 757-58, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
320. See State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 82, 286 A.2d 55, 67 (1972) (Weintraub, C.J.,
concurring) (observing that as a consequence of Jackson, "the Fifth Amendment was
found to harbor the grisly proposition that every defendant must risk death, that his
privilege against self-incrimination is a noose around his neck").
321. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,584 (1968). The Court stated:
But the fact that jury waivers and guilty pleas may occasionally be rejected
hardly implies that all defendants may be required to submit to a full-dress
jury trial as a matter of course. Quite apart from the cruel impact of such a
requirement upon those defendants who would greatly prefer not to contest
their guilt, it is clear-as even the Government recognizes-that the
automatic rejection of all guilty pleas "would rob the criminal process of
much of its flexibility."
Id.
322. No. 2000-0161 (Monroe County Ct. Sept. 27, 2000).
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representation regarding the as-yet-unfied notice of intent to seek the
death penalty.
In Owes, the prosecutor had only two days left to file the notice of
intent to seek the death penalty when both parties jointly advised the
trial judge that they had reached an agreement calling for the
defendant to plead guilty to murder in the first degree and receive a
sentence of life without parole. A written agreement to that effect,
signed by the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant, was
proffered to the court, and the judge agreed to accept the plea. '
At no time prior to the plea did the prosecutor ever announce an
intention not to seek the death penalty. 4 Indeed, during the plea
colloquy, the court informed the defendant "that the charge presently,
Murder in the First Degree, does carry with it a possibility, if notice
was filed, of death by lethal injection.""- Defendant fully allocuted to
the crime under oath, acknowledged the various rights he was
waiving, and indicated his awareness that the plea colloquy could be
used against him in the event his guilty plea was not given effect. He
subsequently received a sentence of life without parole.
On February 1, 2001, the Third Department-the same appellate
court that had decided Edwards- ruled, in People v. Mower,36 that an
Owes-type plea procedure does not violate either Hynes or Edwards.
In Mower, as in Owes, no notice of intent to seek death was ever filed
by the prosecutor, nor did the prosecutor ever expressly waive the
right to file such a notice. Instead, on the very last day before the
expiration of the time period within which the notice of intent to seek
death could be filed, the parties presented the trial judge with a plea
agreement pursuant to which Mower would plead guilty to first-
degree murder and receive a sentence of life without parole.' The
trial judge agreed, and sentenced Mower to the bargained-upon life
sentence.
Mower later sought to vacate his conviction on the ground, inter
alia, that his guilty plea was the result of a "mistake of law" because it
was made pursuant to a plea agreement that provided for a sentence
of life without parole. According to Mower's argument, Hynes
323. Id
324. Cf. Matter of Francois v. Dolan, 95 N.Y.2d 33, 37, 731 N.E.2d 614, 616, 709
N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (2000); see also supra text accompanying notes 252-57 (discussing
Francois).
325. Owes, No. 2000-0161, at 12.
326. 719 N.Y.S.2d 780 (3d Dep't 2001).
327. The parties apparently stipulated to a seven-day extension of the 120-day
statutory time period for filing of the notice of intent to seek death. The plea
agreement was presented to the trial judge on the last day within the seven-day
extension. Id. at 781.
328. The original proceedings against Mower took place in late 1996, long before
Hynes and Edwards were decided. Id. More than three years later, in early 2000,
Mower filed a motion to vacate his conviction based in part on Hynes. Id. The trial
judge denied the request to vacate without a hearing, but the Third Department
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invalidated the only statutory provisions in New York law that would
have allowed for such a sentence to be imposed without a jury verdict
of conviction;329 thus, he claimed, there was no legal basis for the life-
without-parole sentence, and the guilty plea (which was premised on
the legality of such a sentence) was invalid.33°
The Third Department rejected this argument. More importantly,
for present purposes, the appellate court also declared that the plea
negotiations in Mower did not violate Hynes or Edwards:
[Diefendant's argument [about the statutory authority to impose a
sentence of life without parole absent a jury conviction] overlooks
the provision that "[n]othing in this section shall be deemed to
preclude the people at any time from determining that the death
penalty shall not be sought in a particular case, in which case the
separate sentencing proceeding shall not be conducted and the court
may sentence such defendant to life imprisonment without parole"
(CPL 400.27[1]). As the Supreme Court had the statutory authority
to sentence defendant to life imprisonment without parole, and since
the prohibition against pleas and plea negotiations during the
pendency of a death penalty notice is not implicated here because no
such notice was filed in this case (see, Matter of Hynes v. Tomei,
supra; People v. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d 754, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71), we find
defendant's argument to be without merit.331
In light of Owes and Mower, have litigants and trial judges, driven
by the desire to reach negotiated dispositions in potential capital
cases, finally succeeded in finding a route to plea bargaining that is not
constitutionally prohibited under Jackson, Hynes, and Edwards? Is a
plea to first-degree murder, entered with the People's consent prior to
the expiration of the prosecutor's time to file a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty, compatible with the letter and spirit of these cases?
At this point, the only available appellate authority in New York,
Mower, suggests that the answer is yes-so long as the parties either
reach a "meeting of the minds" on disposition within 120 days of
arraignment on the indictment, or succeed in persuading the trial
judge that "good cause" exists for an extension of the statutory
period.332
It is important to note, however, that there are still two competing
theoretical views on the constitutionality of such pleas-neither of
which was mentioned or discussed in Mower. The first theoretical
view sees an Owes/Mower-type plea as fully consistent with both
granted leave to appeal the denial of the motion to vacate, and consolidated that
appeal with the direct appeal from the original judgment of conviction. See id.
329. Namely, the capital plea provisions, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 220.10(5)(e) and
220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
330. Mower, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 781-82.
331. Id. at 782 (emphasis added) (third alteration in original).
332. See People v. Miller, No. 1969/2000 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 2,2000); supra
note 172 (quoting N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.40(2) (McKinney Supp. 2001)).
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Jackson and Hynes, and not at all irreconcilable with Edwards.
Proponents of this view would read Jackson and Hvnes narrowly.
Jackson, they would say, holds only that a statute impermissibly
burdens a defendant's right to trial if it needlessly encourages him to
waive it, and Hynes finds such needless encouragement in New York's
statute only when the case is in a posture of having two different
maximum sentences for first-degree murder depending upon how
guilt is determined. Because the death penalty cannot be imposed
unless a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been timely
filed,33 a case is in the posture of having two different maximum
sentences for first-degree murder only when a notice has been filed
and remains so. In all other circumstances, there is only one
maximum sentence for first-degree murder in New York, namely, life
without parole. Therefore, the argument goes, a guilty plea to murder
in the first degree may be accepted so long as no timely notice of
intent to seek the death penalty has been, and remains, filed at the
time of the plea. Since the pleas in Owes and Mower were proffered
and accepted before any notice of intent was filed, their acceptance
was not prohibited by either Jackson or Hynes.
Those who would hold this view (including, of course, the Third
Department itself in Mower) would find support in the language of
the Court of Appeals in Matter of Francois v. Dolan." There, without
the People's consent, the defendant sought to enter a guilty plea to the
entire indictment, including several first-degree murder charges,
before the prosecutor filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
but well within his time to do so. The trial judge refused to accept the
plea, holding that it was barred by Hynes' admonition that "a
defendant may not plead guilty to first degree murder while a notice
of intent to seek the death penalty is pending. 35 The judge held that
the notice of intent, although not filed, was nevertheless "'pending"
when the defendant's plea was proffered because it was still capable of
being filed.336 Similarly, in Matter of Schroedel i. LaBuda, a case also
involving an attempted unilateral guilty plea, the court wrote that
"Matter of Hynes v. Tomei ... should be read to interpret 'pending' as
meaning both after the notice of intent is filed and served and during
the 120 days in which the People may file the notice."' '
333. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.40(1) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
334. 95 N.Y.2d 33,731 N.E.2d 614,709 N.Y.S.2d 898 (2000).
335. Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 629, 706 N.E.2d 1201. 1208-9, 6S4
N.Y.S.2d 177, 184-85 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999); see Francois, 95
N.Y.2d at 37-38, 731 N.E.2d at 616, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (citing Hynes).
336. See People v. Francois, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 17, 1999, at 38 (Duchess County Ct.
1999).
337. Matter of Schroedel v. LaBuda, 264 A.D.2d 136, 138, 707 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253
(3d Dep't 2000), appeal denied, 95 N.Y.2d 754, 733 N.E.2d 228, 711 N.Y.S.2d 156
(2000), and cert denied, 121 S. Ct. 147, 148 L. Ed. 2d 97 (2000).
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If these holdings had correctly interpreted what the Court of
Appeals meant when it used the word "pending," then the pleas in
Owes and Mower should have been rejected as violative of Hynes
because, although not unilateral, they were nevertheless offered while
the death notice was capable of being filed and therefore was
"pending." When the defendant in Francois brought a proceeding in
the nature of mandamus to compel the trial judge to accept his plea,
however, the Court of Appeals did not endorse this broad
interpretation of "pending. 338
In Francois, the court held only that the defendant had no
unqualified right to have his guilty plea accepted in the 120-day
period.339 In the apparent conflict between the statutes generally
authorizing guilty pleas to an entire indictment without the
prosecutor's consent (Criminal Procedure Law sections 220.10(2) and
220.60(2)) and the newer and more specific provision giving the
District Attorney the authority to decide whether to seek the death
penalty and a period to deliberate on that decision (Criminal
Procedure Law section 250.40), the latter would prevail. Thus, the
Court wrote:
For several reasons we... hold that until the completion of the
statutorily provided deliberative process, either by the filing of a
death penalty notice, announcement of an intention not to seek that
sanction, or by the expiration of the statutory period to make that
decision, a capital defendant does not have an unqualified right to
plead guilty to the entire indictment.34
The Court did not include among those reasons the notion that,
during the 120-day statutory period, the notice of intent to seek the
death penalty is "pending" within the contemplation of Hynes.
Indeed, in recounting what it had done in Hynes, the Court observed:
"Because the District Attorney had already filed a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty .... we also interpreted the statute as
prohibiting a guilty plea to capital murder while such a death penalty
notice was pending .... 341
Those who support Owes and Mower would read this language to
mean that a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is "pending"
only when it is filed and remains so. Thus they would reason that an
Owes/Mower-type plea, proffered not unilaterally but with the
consent of the prosecutor, may be accepted consistent with Hynes at
any time before the notice is filed. Edwards, however, raises
somewhat different concerns.
338. Matter of Francois v. Dolan, 95 N.Y.2d 33, 731 N.E.2d 614, 709 N.Y.S.2d 898
(2000).
339. Id. at 37, 731 N.E.2d at 616, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 36, 731 N.E.2d at 615, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
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Edwards disallowed the practice of delaying the withdrawal of the
notice of intent until after a pleading defendant had been fully
allocuted on the first-degree murder charge. The Edwards court
found that the scheme, which was aimed at reducing the defendant's
opportunity to renege on a plea bargain after the notice of intent was
irrevocably withdrawn, was flawed because it "overlooks the essence
of the Hynes-Jackson infirmity."' - 2 In the court's view:
That constitutional infirmity arises not from the entry of a guilty
plea to murder in the first degree while a death notice is pending,
but from the requirement placed upon a defendant to choose
between pleading guilty to murder in the first degree or opting for
trial while a death notice is pending. If a prosecutor who has served
a death notice is permitted to delay its withdrawal until after a
defendant's plea allocution, then the choice to plead guilty has been
made under compulsion of the death notice and a defendant's 5th
and 6th Amendment rights have been impermissibly burdened-43
Edwards holds, therefore, that the choice to plead guilty to first-
degree murder is unconstitutionally compelled whenever it is made
while a death notice is pending. If, as Edwards suggests, compulsion
exerted on the choice to plead is the real issue, the acceptance of an
Owes/Mower-type plea could be attacked on the theory that the
defendant's choice to plead guilty was unconstitutionally compelled, if
not by a pending death notice, then by the fact that the possibility of a
death sentence remained in the case.
Proponents of OweslMower, however, would not extend Edwards
so as to equate a filed notice of intent with a failure to exclude any
possibility that one might be filed. Compulsion exerted on the choice
to plead, they would argue, was never the issue in either Jackson or
Hynes, and the mere possibility of a death sentence has never been
held to compel unconstitutionally a defendant's choice to plead guilty.
In Jackson, the Supreme Court struck down the Federal Kidnaping
Act, not because the statute coerced guilty pleas, but because it
needlessly encouraged them and thereby imposed an impermissible
burden upon the assertion of the constitutional right to a jury trial.'
Jackson never suggested that the possibility of a death sentence exerts
so coercive an influence on a capital defendant as to render his choice
to plead guilty involuntary. Indeed, in Brady v. United States,'
decided only two years after Jackson, the Supreme Court wrote that
"a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the
possibility of a death penalty."'  Later that same year, in North
342. People v. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d 754,757,712 N.Y.S.2d 71,75 (3d Dep't 2000).
343. Id
344. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,582-83 (1968).
345. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
346. Id at 755.
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Carolina v. Alford,347 the Court upheld the guilty plea of a defendant
who not only said he was pleading guilty to avoid the death penalty,
but also insisted that he was innocent of the crime. Edwards failed to
cite either Brady or Alford.
Moreover, observing that "nothing in Jackson prohibits imposing
different penalties for different crimes," the Hynes Court itself wrote
that its holding would not prevent a defendant from pleading guilty
"to another offense not punishable by death, even when a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty is pending." 8 Thus, under Hynes,
the choice of a capital defendant in New York to plead guilty to
second-degree murder while a death notice is pending is not
unconstitutionally compelled. If a filed death notice does not
unconstitutionally compel a choice to plead guilty, it is difficult to see
why the mere failure to exclude with certainty all possibility of a death
sentence would have that effect. 49 Thus, proponents of Owes/Mower
would conclude that Edwards' "compelled-choice" analysis would not
prevent the acceptance of a guilty plea to first-degree murder that is
proffered with the consent of the People, within the 120-day period
following arraignment, and before a notice of intent is filed.
The second, competing theoretical view would hold that the
distinctions drawn between the Owes and Mower and the Edwards
and Francois lines of cases are not of constitutional dimension under
Jackson, Hynes, or Edwards. Under this view, the burden on
constitutional rights prohibited by Jackson was recreated in Owes and
Mower, notwithstanding the invalidation by Hynes of New York's
offending statutory provisions. Although for the first time in more
than one hundred years, New York is without a statutory bar to guilty
pleas for crimes punishable by death, it is clear that a defendant
charged with first-degree murder in New York still may not receive a
death sentence pursuant to a plea of guilty350 and faces a maximum
sentence of life in prison without parole.351 Owes/Mower-type pleas
thus reintroduce the sentencing disparity between convictions upon
guilty pleas and those resulting from jury trials which Hynes, in
reliance upon Jackson, found unconstitutional and sought to eliminate
by striking the statutory provisions. That is, two potential maximum
347. 400 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1970).
348. Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 629, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1209, 684
N.Y.S.2d 177, 185 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
349. Indeed, it would seem that, because of the more favorable sentencing range, a
plea to the lesser crime of second-degree murder would more likely be compelled by
the possibility of a death sentence than would a plea to first-degree murder.
350. See N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2.
351. See Matter of Francois v. Dolan, 95 N.Y.2d 33, 38, 731 N.E.2d 614, 616, 709
N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (2000) ("Thus, the only legal sentence upon a guilty plea would be
either life imprisonment without parole or a term of years in prison."); see also Hynes,
92 N.Y.2d at 629 n.7, 706 N.E.2d at 1208 n.7, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 184 n.7 ("[Q]nly a jury
can impose a death sentence .... ").
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punishments exist for the crime of murder in the first degree-life
without parole where the defendant pleads guilty, and the possibility
of execution where the defendant proceeds to trial-since the
prosecution may still file a notice of intent if the plea goes awry?2
The defendant can, with certainty, avoid a death sentence only by
waiving his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
In Owes-as in every one of the six similar cases (including Mower)
that were concluded during the first five years after the enactment of
the New York death-penalty statute-when the defendant pleaded
guilty to first-degree murder and received the negotiated sentence of
life in prison without parole, without a notice of intent to seek the
death penalty ever having been filed, the prosecutor still retained the
right to file a death notice at the time the plea was entered.3  In both
Owes and Mower, as in the five other such cases, the possibility of a
death sentence still hung over the defendant if he chose trial, but not
if he pleaded guilty. From a holistic perspective, then, the plea
negotiations in Owes and Mower proceeded in the shadow of death
every bit as much as they had in Edwards and Smelefsky. As in
Edwards, "the choice to plead guilty has been made under compulsion
of the death notice and a defendant's 5th and 6th Amendment rights
have been impermissibly burdened.""
Under this second view, the language in Hynes must be read in
context: the Court's decision "does not prevent pleas of guilty to first
degree murder when no notice of intent to seek the death penalty is
pending, since defendants in that situation face the same maximum
sentence regardless of how they are convicted." 3" This language from
Hynes implicitly defines "pendency" to include the time within which
notice may be filed, because the only time the same potential
maximum sentence exists is after death has been irrevocably taken out
of the case. Under this view, then, the pendency of a death notice and
the potentiality of a death sentence would be equally present both
during the time when the prosecutor may still file the notice, and once
the notice has actually been filed. Indeed, it is obvious that if this
were not the case, defendants would lack any incentive to agree to
Owes/Mower-type pleas."6 Precisely because of its effectiveness as an
inducement for defendants to plead guilty in exchange for a lifetime of
incarceration, this view would hold that the shadow of death
352. See People v. Owes, No. 2000-0161 (Monroe County C1. Sept. 27, 2000).
353. See supra text accompanying note 296. But see infra note 356.
354. People v. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d 754, 757, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71, 75 (3d Dep't 2000).
355. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 629,706 N.E.2d at 1209,684 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
356. But see People v. Godineaux, No. 1845/00 (Sup. Ct. Queens County Jan. 22,
2001) (concerning a defendant who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, even
though the prosecutor had unilaterally and irrevocably agreed not to seek the death
penalty). In such cases, it can never be known whether the prosecution and defense
may have reached a tacit agreement on the final disposition prior to the prosecutor's
declaration that the death penalty would not be sought.
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needlessly burdens the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
in an Owes/Mower-type situation.
Moreover, this contextual view would likely cast Owes and Mower
as even more constitutionally troubling than the aforementioned
lower-court cases357 that permitted guilty pleas where death was out of
the case at the time the plea was entered, so that technical compliance
was had with Hynes. In Owes and Mower, the real possibility of a
death sentence was never eliminated from the case prior to the entry
of the defendant's plea, so in no sense was compliance had with
Hynes. Thus, in contrast to Edwards, in Owes and Mower both the
negotiations leading to the decision to plead guilty and the entry of
the plea itself took place while "'the possibility of death ''35 still
loomed over the case. Finally, the notion that prosecutorial consent
could eliminate the constitutional infirmity in the situation, the
contextualists would say, was put to rest in Hynes itsel 59 and is a
concept distinct from, and not directly correlated with, the
constitutionality, or voluntariness, of plea bargaining.360
Until the New York Court of Appeals eventually addresses the
validity of Owes/Mower pleas under Hynes and Jackson, this
theoretical difference of opinion will remain unresolved. Perhaps
even more importantly, for present purposes, the theoretical dispute
underlying Owes and Mower further evidences the continuing need
for Supreme Court clarification of Jackson.
IV. PLEA BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH-
MAKING SENSE OF UNITED STATES V. JACKSON
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Hynes delivered
a substantial shock to the administration of New York's capital
punishment system. The Hynes court relied on the United States
Supreme Court's Jackson decision to invalidate the statutory
provisions authorizing capital defendants to plead guilty while the
prosecutor's notice of death was pending, so long as the prosecutor
and court agreed to drop the death penalty in exchange for the plea.36'
Following a brief period of confusion and uncertainty, however,
creative New York trial judges began to craft legal solutions to the
problems engendered by Hynes. These solutions managed to meet
the letter of the law set forth in Hynes and Jackson, while
simultaneously preserving the ability of prosecutors, defense
357. See supra Part III.E.2 (citing and discussing relevant cases).
358. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d at 758, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 75 (quoting Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at
626, 706 N.E.2d at 1207, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 183).
359. Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 624, 706 N.E.2d at 1206, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 182 ("[T]he need
to obtain approval from the People and the court will not save plea provisions that
otherwise violate Jackson." (citation omitted)).
360. See infra notes 411-20 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Part III.D.
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attorneys, defendants, and trial judges to do what they had always
done before (in New York and every other death-penalty jurisdiction)
in capital cases: reach a universally acceptable compromise, prior to
trial, under which the defendant would plead guilty to the charged
murder in exchange for his life.'
If Hynes was a shock, Edwards was the equivalent of an atomic
bomb. In Edwards, the Third Department of the Appellate Division
essentially prohibited the aforementioned legal solution to the Hynes
problem. Under Edwards, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
defendants, and trial judges must comply with what the Edwards court
perceived as the true spirit of Hynes, not merely the letter of the law
contained therein. Thus, under Edwards, prosecutors may not even
discuss a potential plea bargain to first-degree murder with a
defendant facing a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, let alone
enter into one.36 Once the prosecutor declares the case to be capital
by serving and filing a notice of intent, the capital case must proceed
to a jury trial and, upon conviction, to a capital sentencing hearing,
unless the prosecutor decides unilaterally (and irrevocably) to drop
the notice of death and accept life without possibility of parole as the
maximum possible punishment. Presumably, not even a "nudge-
nudge, wink-wink" agreement with the defendant can be the basis for
the prosecutor's decision to drop the notice of death.'
After Hynes, the day-to-day administration of capital cases in New
York could (and did) eventually return to normal; after Edwards, on
the other hand, everything must change. Both of these decisions,
however, purported to be based on Jackson. How can this be?
A closer analysis of Jackson, together with the Supreme Court's
post-Jackson decisions that directly or indirectly involved plea
bargaining and the death penalty, reveals that Jackson remains-more
than thirty years after it was handed down-a completely mystifying
decision. The jurisprudential tensions abound. How can Jackson,
which invalidated a death-penalty statutory provision because it
"needlessly encourage[d]" guilty pleas," s be squared with Brady,
Parker, and Alford, which upheld the validity of guilty pleas entered
to avoid the effects of the very same (in Brady) or a nearly identical
(in Parker and Alford) death-penalty statutory provision? " '
Moreover, how can Jackson be squared with Hayes, which is routinely
viewed today as authorizing prosecutors to threaten defendants,
during plea negotiations, with the death penalty in order to encourage
them to plead guilty?367 And how can Jackson be squared with
362. See supra Part III.E.
363. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d at 757-58, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 75-76.
364. See supra notes 309-21 and accompanying text.
365. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,583 (1968) (emphasis omitted).
366. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text, Part I1.A-B.
367. See supra Part II.D.
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Corbitt, a case that-as was obvious to the Corbitt dissenters-seems
to undermine Jackson's jurisprudential foundations, even while
declining expressly to overrule it?361
Because the Supreme Court has never had (or has never taken) the
opportunity to make sense of Jackson, the New York courts today are
faced with the daunting task of trying to figure out the meaning and
significance of Jackson for themselves. This task would have been
hard enough back in 1968; now, after more than thirty years of
subsequent developments, it is all but impossible.
Rather than attempt to evaluate whether or not the New York
courts have reached the "correct" resolution of the issues in Hynes
and Edwards-an evaluation that would involve largely uninformed
speculation, given the absence of meaningful guidance from the
Supreme Court over the past thirty years-we propose a completely
different approach. Our alternative approach is to try to imagine
what the Supreme Court, if it were to revisit the issue in Jackson
today, would say about the issues presented in that case. In other
words, we propose to address this hypothetical question: How would
the current Supreme Court make sense out of Jackson today,
especially in light of such later decisions as Brady, Parker, Alford,
Hayes, and Corbitt?
We believe that there are at least five competing, theoretically
plausible approaches by which the Supreme Court could make sense
out of Jackson today-in other words, five competing views about the
contemporary significance of Jackson-each of which would lead to
vastly different consequences for the New York statute. In this final
section, we describe and briefly analyze each of these five competing
approaches, starting with the most limited view of Jackson's
contemporary significance and proceeding to more expansive
interpretations.
A. Subsequent Developments have Effectively Overruled Jackson
One plausible approach to Jackson would be for the Supreme Court
simply to explain that the case no longer constitutes a significant part
of the contemporary constitutional jurisprudence of the Court.
Perhaps Jackson is best seen as a vestigial remnant of its peculiar
times, reflecting a view of capital punishment, and of plea bargaining,
that is no longer shared by a majority of the contemporary Court.
Jackson, after all, was decided in 1968, just a few years before the
Supreme Court ruled in Furman v. Georgia369 that all then-existing
state death-penalty statutes violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause. 3 ° Even before Furman, the death
368. See supra Part II.E.
369. 408 U.S. 238,239-40 (1972).
370. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
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penalty in America was in serious decline, public support for it was
waning, there was a de facto moratorium on executions, and many
observers believed that legal abolition was close at hand." Under
these circumstances, it would not have been surprising for the Court
to view the situation in Jackson as merely a minor item on a much
more important agenda-the potential elimination of capital
punishment altogether. Even if the Court was not yet ready to make
such a major and controversial move, Jackson may have appeared to
the Court as a less controversial ruling, in the same general direction,
on which most of the Justices could agree. In short, consistent with
the Court's usual process of incremental constitutional decision-
making, Jackson-at the time-may have represented merely a small
step in the direction of Furman.
In addition, it is important to note that Jackson was decided before
the Court had fully come to terms with the extremely common (but
previously largely unreviewed) practice of plea bargaining. The
Court's major decisions in the area-most notably, Brady v. United
States372 and Bordenkircher v. Hayes373 -were still at least two years
away at the time Jackson arose. Thus, Jackson may reflect not only
anticipation of Furman's eventual rejection of the death penalty, but
also judicial queasiness about plea bargaining. Ultimately, of course,
the Court overcame such queasiness and ruled in favor of the
constitutional legitimacy of plea bargaining. And today, plea
bargaining is such a ubiquitous practice374-even in capital cases-that
it seems unthinkable that the Court would find it constitutionally
troubling. This outcome, however, was not at all obvious at the time
of Jackson, and the Court's uncertainty over plea bargaining should
be seen as part of Jackson's subtext.
Yet another subtext for Jackson -perhaps more subtle and easier to
overlook-was the novel doctrine of "impermissible burdens" on the
exercise of constitutional rights that had first been developed by the
Court just a few years earlier in Griffin v. California.37' At the time of
Jackson, Griffin probably appeared to have a bright future, as the
vanguard of a new and potentially far-reaching set of limitations on
the powers of government. In the thirty-plus years since Jackson,
however, Griffin has significantly diminished in importance, to the
point where it clearly no longer occupies a central role in the
Rehnquist Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Two years ago, in
Mitchell v. United States,376 Justice Scalia sharply criticized the
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
371. See Furman 408 U.S. at 299-300 (Brennan. J., concurring).
372. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
373. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
374. See Milton Heumann, Plea Bargaining 1 (1978).
375. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
376. 526 U.S. 314, 336 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reasoning of Griffin. And just this past year, in Portuondo v. Agard,377
a majority of the Court (in an opinion written by Justice Scalia)
rejected the extension of Griffin to ban prosecutorial comment on the
fact that a defendant testified at his trial after hearing all other
witnesses, on the ground that the challenged comment merely asked
the jury to draw an inference that was "natural and irresistible," and
hence not unfair . 7  Agard suggests that the current Court views
Griffin as a due process "fundamental fairness" case, rather than a
penumbral Fifth Amendment case.379 Such a shift in rationale, if it is
confirmed in future cases, would further limit the scope of Griffin,
since it would mean that only "fundamentally unfair" burdens on
constitutional rights would be prohibited."
Finally, there is the obvious (if slightly extra-legal) fact that the
contemporary Supreme Court is a far cry from the one that decided
Jackson in 1968. That Court included Chief Justice Earl Warren and
Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Fortas; on almost any
measure, the contemporary Court would seem to be much more pro-
death-penalty, much more pro-plea-bargaining, and generally much
more anti-defendant than the Jackson Court (although it should be
noted that the decision in Jackson was reached by a broad six-vote
majority that excluded only Justices White and Black, who dissented,
and Justice Marshall, who did not participate). 381
On the basis of these historical observations, it seems a safe bet
that, if Jackson were to arise today, the current Court would not
decide the case the same way it did back in 1968. Even though the
Court has neither overruled Jackson nor openly expressed any
dissatisfaction with it, perhaps the only reason that the case survives is
that there has been virtually no reason for the Court to bury it; after
all, no significant Jackson issue has reached the Court since Corbitt
back in 1978.3s Under this view, if the Court were to revisit Jackson
today, it probably would hold that incentives for guilty pleas-
whether such incentives arise from the discretionary actions of a
prosecutor or from the mandatory effects of a pure statutory
"discount" scheme-are necessary and desirable aspects of the
American criminal justice system, even in capital cases. And, if the
Court ultimately were to adopt this approach, then both Hynes and
Edwards-which relied on Jackson's continuing precedential force-
obviously would need to be revisited as well.
377. 529 U.S. 61 (2000).
378. Id. at 67.
379. See id. at 65-68.
380. See id.
381. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 591 (1968).
382. As noted, supra note 229 and accompanying text, in 1999, the Court had the
opportunity to review the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Hynes but
declined to grant certiorari. See Hynes v. Tomei, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999) (denying
certiorari).
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B. Corbitt Limited Jackson to Pure Statutory "Discounts, " Involving
No Connection Between the Statute and Traditional Plea Bargaining
by the Prosecutor
A second plausible approach to Jackson would be for the Supreme
Court to emphasize the fact that it subsequently upheld the similar
New Jersey statute that was challenged in Corbitt v. New Jersey.?O In
Corbitt, the Court relied on several post-Jackson plea-bargaining
decisions to hold that the New Jersey statute did not impermissibly
provide incentives for defendants to waive their constitutional rights
and plead guilty:
The New Jersey Supreme Court observed [below] that the
"encouragement of guilty defendants not to contest their guilt is at
the very heart of an effective plea negotiation program." Its
conclusion was that in this light there were substantial benefits to
the State in providing the opportunity for lesser punishment and
that the statutory pattern could not be deemed a needless or
arbitrary burden on the defendant's constitutional rights within the
meaning of United States v. Jackson.
We are in essential agreement with the New Jersey Supreme
Court.38
The Corbitt dissenters complained that Corbitt had effectively
overruled Jackson,3s but the Corbitt majority did not purport to do so.
How, then, can Corbitt and Jackson be reconciled? The answer to this
question may provide a valuable clue to making sense of Jackson.
One obvious way for the Court to reconcile Corbitt and Jackson
would be to focus on the fact that Corbitt, unlike Jackson, involved a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment.' But the Corbitt majority
cited this distinction as only one of several seemingly independent
bases for reaching a different conclusion from the one reached in
Jackson.3 7 By so doing, the Court implied that the existence of any
one of the several available distinctions might justify upholding the
challenged statute. There is no clear indication in Corbitt that the
absence of any particular distinction from Jackson, such as the
possibility of a death sentence after trial, would have been fatal to the
challenged statute's constitutionality.
Along similar lines, another obvious way to reconcile the cases
would be to note that Corbitt, unlike Jackson, involved a statute under
which defendants who pleaded guilty remained eligible for the same
maximum sentence of life imprisonment as those who went to jury
383. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
384. Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted).
385. Id. at 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
386. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 217.
387. Id. at 217, 223.
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trial (although it was no longer mandatory in plea cases).3" Again,
however, the Corbitt majority did not clearly state whether or not this
particular distinction was necessary to the outcome of the case.
A third, perhaps less obvious, way to reconcile Jackson and Corbitt
would be to conclude that Jackson-which did not involve plea
bargaining at all-survives Corbitt, but that any similar statute
designed, either in whole or in part, to facilitate or regulate traditional
plea bargaining by the prosecutor (and for which there is no equally
effective but less burdensome alternative) should, after Corbitt,
withstand a Jackson challenge. This view would be based on the
Corbitt Court's oft-repeated recognition of the value of plea
bargaining to both the prosecution and the defense, as well as on its
acknowledgment that the numerous post-Jackson plea-bargaining
decisions had upheld practices "that, although encouraging guilty
pleas, were not 'needless' [within the meaning of Jackson]."3 89 Even a
statute like the one at issue in Corbitt, which did not directly address
traditional plea bargaining at all, would survive constitutional review
so long as one of its purposes was to "set[] the limits within which plea
bargaining on punishment may take place.""39
Under this view, the best example of a case whose outcome would
be affected by Corbitt-i.e., a case that would most likely be resolved
differently under Jackson, after Corbitt-is Atkinson v. North
Carolina.91 In Atkinson, the challenged North Carolina murder
statute -although it created a sentencing disparity similar to the one
in Jackson-was nevertheless closely connected with the practice of
traditional plea bargaining, in that the defendant's tendered guilty
plea could not be accepted without the consent of both the prosecutor
and the trial judge."9 In this sense, like the statute in Corbitt, the
statute in Atkinson served "the State's legitimate interest in
encouraging the entry of guilty pleas and in facilitating plea
bargaining. '393 If Corbitt effectively limited Jackson, then it seems
likely that, after Corbitt, the Court would have construed the North
388. Id. at 217.
389. Id. at 219 n.9.
390. Id. at 222. The New Jersey statute at issue in Corbitt indirectly regulated plea
bargaining because it provided that defendants who were not convicted by juries
would receive, at the judge's discretion, either a sentence of life imprisonment or a
term of no more than thirty years. Id. at 217-18. Presumably, almost all defendants
who entered plea agreements with the prosecutor under the statute did so in return
for the prosecutor's promise to recommend to the judge a term of no more than thirty
years (because the alternative, life imprisonment, was already the harshest sentence
that could have been imposed, even after a jury trial). Thus, the practical effect of the
New Jersey statute was to limit the scope of plea-bargaining discussions to
recommendations for sentences of no more than thirty years.
391. 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
392. See, e.g., id., rev'g State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969).
393. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 222. See supra note 390 for an explanation of why the
statute at issue in Corbitt effectively regulated plea bargaining.
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Carolina statute as being more like the New Jersey statute upheld in
Corbitt-and hence constitutional-than like the statute in Jackson.
Indeed, if anything, the statute in Atkinson was even more obviously
aimed at facilitating plea bargaining than was the New Jersey statute
that was upheld on that basis (at least in part) in Corbitt.
If Jackson was indeed limited by Corbitt, then the lone remaining
category of statutes that would still be governed by Jackson, and that
would still not pass constitutional muster, would be the narrow
category of statutes creating what might be called a "pure" statutory
discount-absent any possible connection with the "give-and-take" of
traditional plea negotiations between the prosecutor and the
defense-for defendants who waive their constitutional rights and
plead guilty. This is precisely the same category of statutes that
Justice Stewart, the author of Jackson, identified in his Corbitt
concurrence as being most clearly prohibited by Jackson."
In conclusion, under this view, if the Court were to revisit Jackson
today, it would probably hold that Corbitt limited Jackson. Any
statute designed to facilitate or regulate the practice of plea
bargaining would pass constitutional muster, even if the statute
authorized two different punishments for the same crime, death and
non-death, depending on whether or not a defendant pleads guilty. If
the Court were to so hold, the New York statute would have to be
reexamined carefully to determine whether that statute is designed to
facilitate or regulate the practice of plea bargaining, or whether it
provides a "pure" statutory discount to those defendants who choose
to plead guilty.
C. Jackson and Afford Remain Good Law, and Continue to Prohibit
Legislative Schemes That Authorize Two Different Punishments
(Death and Non-Death) for the Same Crime, Depending Upon
Whether a Defendant Proceeds to Jury Trial or Pleads Guilty, and That
"Needlessly Encourage" the Waiver of Constitutional Rights
A third approach to Jackson would be for the Supreme Court
simply to reaffirm both that decision and the subsequent decision in
North Carolina v. Alford,395 as interpreted and applied by the New
York Court of Appeals in Hynes. Under this view, the Supreme
Court might decide that, despite the passage of time and intervening
case law, Jackson and Alford nevertheless remain good law-and still
prohibit, at a minimum, all capital punishment statutes that authorize
two different punishments (death and non-death) for the same crime,
depending upon whether a defendant proceeds to jury trial or pleads
guilty, and that "needlessly encourage" the waiver of constitutional
rights.
394. 439 U.S. at 226-28 (Stewart, J., concurring).
395. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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How does one decide whether a particular burden on constitutional
rights is "needless"? This issue can perhaps best be understood if one
follows the approach of Professor Becker, who has construed Jackson
as employing a two-tiered inquiry to determine the constitutionality of
plea-bargaining systems.396 First, does the system have any legitimate
purpose, other than chilling the exercise of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who assert them? If not, the system fails ab initio.
Second, are the particular characteristics of the system necessary to
implement the legitimate purposes served? 39 As the Jackson Court
stated: "The question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental'
rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is
unnecessary and therefore excessive. "398
In Jackson itself, the first question was answered in the affirmative:
the Federal Kidnaping Act sought to limit imposition of the death
penalty to cases in which a jury recommended it, an entirely legitimate
goal. The second question, however, garnered a negative response.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the purpose of requiring a jury to
recommend a sentence of death as a precondition to its imposition
could be achieved without burdening the constitutional rights of
defendants who maintained their innocence and demanded a jury
trial, e.g., by allowing a jury to determine sentence in every case under
the statute, regardless of how the conviction was obtained. 399 Thus,
the burden on trial rights could not be justified and the statute
violated the Constitution.
Turning to the New York death-penalty statute, history suggests
that the statutory scheme was designed to serve two separate and
legitimate goals. First, as in Jackson, the statute sought to insure that
death sentences would be imposed only upon a jury's determination
to do so. Second, the statute incorporated New York's longstanding
protective policy, dating from 1889, of preventing defendants from
condemning themselves to death, by prohibiting guilty pleas where
death was a potential sentence.4" Because these statutory purposes
are both clearly legitimate and independent of any desire to
encourage the entry of guilty pleas and waiver of constitutional trial
rights, the New York statute satisfies the first prong of the Becker
test.
Under the second prong of the Becker test, the inquiry turns to
whether the particular characteristics of the system are necessary in
order to implement the legitimate purposes served. Initially, it must
be acknowledged that the New York statute, as written, clearly serves
396. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 757, 793 (1988); see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968).
397. Becker, supra note 396, at 793; see Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-83.
398. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582.
399. Id. at 582-83
400. See supra Part III.A.3.
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both of the aforementioned legitimate goals. The statute limits the
use of the death penalty to cases in which the jury recommends it, and
also prevents a defendant from committing state-sanctioned suicide by
prohibiting defendants from pleading guilty, except upon a promise of
a non-death sentence. Nevertheless, the statute accomplishes its
legitimate goals by a particular method that, as recognized by the
Hynes Court, has the effect of encouraging defendants to waive their
constitutional rights and plead guilty.4"'
The second prong of the Becker test therefore requires a further
determination of whether a viable alternative exists that would also
accomplish both of these two legitimate goals without similarly
encouraging guilty pleas.' In other words, are New York's statutory
plea-bargaining restrictions necessary to achieve these two legitimate
governmental purposes?
With respect to the jury-sentencing goal of the New York statute, as
in Jackson, this goal could also be achieved by the establishment of
universal jury sentencing procedures applicable to all first-degree
murder cases, regardless of the method by which guilt is established.
Moreover, the remedy actually adopted by the Hynes Court-namely,
the prohibition of guilty pleas to first-degree murder whenever a
death notice was pending-also serves to ensure that the death
penalty will be imposed only on the basis of a jury's determination.
Thus, the jury-sentencing goal does not create a necessity for the
burdens imposed upon Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and the
New York law cannot pass constitutional muster on that basis.
The remaining legitimate statutory goal, protecting against a
defendant's state-sanctioned suicide, likewise could be addressed in
two alternative ways, depending on how that particular goal is
interpreted. First, if the goal is interpreted as simply representing a
legislative desire not to allow a defendant to plead guilty to a capital
charge and thereby ensure his own execution, then the alternative of
universal jury sentencing would also serve this goal, because even if
the defendant pleads guilty, such a procedure would still interpose a
jury's reasoned sentencing determination between the defendant's
unilateral desire to die and the actual imposition of a death
sentence.403
Second, even if the goal is interpreted more broadly to include a
legislative desire not to allow a defendant to take any substantial step
401. See supra Part III.D.
402. Although it is not necessary to the argument in this section, it should be noted
that banning all guilty pleas in potential capital cases, whether or not a death notice
has been filed, would not be considered a viable alternative under Jackson. See infra
note 428 and accompanying text.
403. For a contrary view, see infra text accompanying notes 426-27, presenting the
argument that-under a broader interpretation of the goal of preventing state-
sanctioned suicide-universal jury sentencing might not adequately serve this goal.
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in the direction of his own execution,4" then this goal could still be
met in the exact same manner that the New York Court of Appeals
ultimately chose as its judicially-imposed remedy in Hynes, i.e., by
prohibiting guilty pleas to first-degree murder until the potential for a
death sentence is removed from the case, as was done in the 1970
statute based upon the Temporary Commission's recommendations. 5
Although the Hynes Court's chosen remedy for the Jackson problem
still permits defendants to plead guilty to the lesser crime of second-
degree murder, Alford, as construed by the Hynes Court, stands
squarely for the proposition that this is not constitutionally suspect, as
disparate penalties are not imposed for the same crime depending
upon the exercise or waiver of constitutional trial rights.0 6
Thus, applying Professor Becker's two-part articulation of the
Jackson inquiry to the 1995 New York death-penalty statute produces
the following result: The statutory scheme serves two legitimate
purposes other than promoting plea bargaining, but the statute's
establishment of death as the maximum penalty for first-degree
murder convictions by jury trial but not by guilty plea is not necessary
to the achievement of those purposes. For this reason, and as
concluded by the New York Court of Appeals in Hynes, the New
York law "needlessly" encourages guilty pleas and unnecessarily
burdens the exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in violation
of Jackson. 7
Under this view of Jackson, which is premised on the continued
vitality of both Jackson and Alford, it should be noted that subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, such as Hayes and Corbitt, are properly
distinguishable from the situation in Jackson. In Hayes, the unique
penalty of death was not involved, and the possibility of greater
punishment existed only if the prosecutor brought an additional
charge. The choice presented to the defendant in Hayes therefore did
not involve two maximum penalties for the same crime depending
upon whether or not Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were
exercised.4 8 In Corbitt, the majority opinion expressly found it to be
"a material fact" that it was not dealing with a death-penalty statutory
provision.40 9 Furthermore, there was no difference in the maximum
punishment available after a trial by jury or a guilty plea to the charge;
a jury could, after trial, find a defendant guilty only of a lesser-
included offense, thus resulting in the imposition of a lesser sentence,
while a trial judge accepting a plea to the charge was still empowered
404. Under such an interpretation, the alternative of universal jury sentencing
would not serve this goal. See infra notes 426-27 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
406. Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 629-30, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1209, 684
N.Y.S.2d 177, 185 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
407. Id. at 626, 706 N.E.2d at 1207, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
408. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,363-65 (1978).
409. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,217 (1978).
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to impose the maximum life sentence. Thus, again, two different
maximum penalties did not exist for the same crime, because the risk
of a greater punishment was not automatically avoided by a
defendant's entry of a plea to the charge."'
Moreover, under this interpretation of Jackson, the fact that the
New York statute involved a statutory plea-bargaining rule, as
distinguished from the "legislatively ordained penalty scheme" ''
involved under the Federal Kidnaping Act, correctly played no role in
the Hynes Court's determination. The rationale underlying the
Supreme Court's decision in Brady, which involved a statute that
"legislatively" imposed the death penalty after jury trial but offered
leniency upon the surrender of that right by entry of a guilty plea,
focused on the "mutuality of advantage 4 12 engendered by the practice
of plea bargaining. The Court expressed its unwillingness to hold it
unconstitutional "for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who
in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who
demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his
crime." '413 The Court further recognized the legitimacy of plea
bargaining as emanating from its assumed reliability,4 and declared
its disbelief that the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of
leniency would drive defendants to false condemnation." The
Supreme Court majority, in other words, drew no constitutional
distinction between the statutory discount scheme at issue in Brady
and considerations inherent in plea bargaining generally. Similarly,
Justice Brennan concluded in Brady and Parker that neither the
participation of the prosecutor nor the interposition of defense
counsel in the plea negotiation process would necessarily afford the
defendant the equal bargaining power generally envisioned in that
process or insulate the defendant from the effects of a statutorily-
imposed legislative dilemma.416 This conclusion evinced the concern
that relief from guilty pleas, whether the result of legislative discounts
(as in Brady) or plea bargaining (as in Parker), should be
constitutionally required whenever the unconstitutional death-penalty
scheme played a significant role in the defendant's determination to
plead guilty.417  In short, neither Brady nor Parker drew a
constitutional distinction or applied a different constitutional
410. See Hynes, 92 N.Y.2d at 625,706 N.E.2d at 1206,684 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
411. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
412. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
413. Id. at 753.
414. Whether an assumption about the reliability of guilty pleas would find such
ready acceptance today is open to question. See infra notes 435-36 and accompanying
text.
415. Brady, 397 U.S. at 758.
416. See Parker, 397 U.S. at 803-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brady, 397 U.S. at
756-58.
417. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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standard, depending on whether the statutory scheme involved a
statutory discount or statutorily-authorized plea bargaining between
the parties. The critical issue, instead, was whether the statute
needlessly burdened constitutional rights, and the Court made clear
that not all burdens designed to facilitate plea bargaining would be
deemed necessary. 18
In any case, the Supreme Court's subsequent recognition in Corbitt
that "plea bargaining by state prosecutors operates by virtue of state
law" '419 underscores the fact that any negotiated plea carrying a
promise of leniency operates pursuant to statutory limits, with the
legislature setting the maximum term for all offenses.420 Seen through
this lens, the presence or absence of the prosecutor in the statutorily-
authorized process is immaterial. It is the nature of the pressure on
the defendant to forgo the assertion of his constitutional rights (i.e.,
needless pressure to avoid death) that is constitutionally
determinative, not its source. For all these reasons, then, there was no
basis for the Court of Appeals in Hynes to reject Jackson as applying
only to statutory discount cases and not to plea-bargaining cases.
In conclusion, under this view, the Court might hold that both
Jackson and Alford remain good law, and that all statutes that
"needlessly encourage" the waiver of constitutional rights by
authorizing two different punishments (death and non-death) for the
same crime, depending on whether or not a defendant pleads guilty,
remain unconstitutional under Jackson. This view, of course,
represents the exact situation actually faced by the New York Court
of Appeals in Hynes-because the Hynes Court was bound to apply
both Jackson and Alford as if they remained good law. Thus, if the
current Supreme Court were to reaffirm Jackson and Alford, there
would be no need for the Court of Appeals to revisit its decision in
Hynes, although it would still have to decide whether or not the Third
Department's particular applications of Hynes in Edwards and Mower
were correct.
D. Jackson Remains Good Law, and-Based on the Underlying
Rationale of Griffin-Prohibits All Statutes That "Needlessly Burden"
Constitutional Rights
A fourth approach to Jackson would be for the Supreme Court to
hold that the essence of Jackson-and Griffin, on which it was
based42 -is to prohibit all "needless burdens" on the exercise of
constitutional rights, whether or not those "needless burdens" result
418. See Becker, supra note 396, at 793 & n.207.
419. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,224 n.14 (1978).
420. See State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 79, 286 A.2d 55, 65 (1972) (Weintraub, C.J.,
concurring).
421. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship between
Griffin and Jackson).
2384 [Vol. 69
2001] PLEA BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OFDEATH 2385
from a statute that creates a two-tiered punishment scheme (death
and non-death) for the same crime.
Under this view, the Court might reaffirm the basic wisdom of
Griffin and Jackson, but reject the suggestion, seemingly adopted by
the Hynes Court, that Alford limited the Jackson rule to those
situations where the defendant is encouraged to plead guilty by a
statutory punishment scheme that creates two different punishments
(death and non-death) for the same crime, depending on whether or
not the defendant pleads guilty. Why, after all, should it be
unconstitutional for a statute needlessly to encourage a defendant to
waive his constitutional rights and plead guilty by creating two
different punishments for the same crime, but permissible for a statute
needlessly to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser crime?
If the Court were to revisit Jackson and hold that it extends to all
"needless burdens" on constitutional rights, and not only those
situations where a statute authorizes two different punishments (death
and non-death) for the same crime, then the constitutional analysis of
the New York death-penalty statute in Hynes arguably needs to be
revisited. Indeed, under this view, it is arguable that New York's
capital plea-bargaining system, as it existed before Hynes, did not
"needlessly" burden constitutional rights, even when measured under
Professor Becker's approach. This is so because the Hynes remedy,
although adequately serving both legitimate statutory goals-i.e.,
allowing a jury to make the life or death decision and preventing
state-sanctioned suicide-is not a viable alternative to the statute
because it still has the effect of encouraging defendants to waive their
right to a jury trial and plead guilty, albeit to the lesser-included
offense of second-degree murder.
In Jackson, the only legitimate purpose suggested by the
Government in defense of the Act was that it mitigated the severity of
capital punishment by limiting the death penalty to cases in which a
jury recommends it.4" Although acknowledging that objective as
legitimate, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that the Act's
selective death-penalty provision could not be justified by its
ostensible purpose because that purpose could be achieved without
penalizing defendants who plead not guilty and demand a jury trial.
As an example of a viable alternative that would achieve that result,
the Court pointed to systems in which a jury always determines
penalty regardless of how guilt is determined. The availability of this
and other alternatives, the Court held, made the Act's encouragement
of guilty pleas unnecessary and therefore excessive.4 -
422. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,581-82 (1968).
423. Id. at 582-83.
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By contrast, and as previously noted, New York's statutory
structure apparently was designed to serve two legitimate purposes.424
First, like the Federal Kidnaping Act, it was designed to mitigate the
severity of capital punishment by limiting the death penalty to cases in
which a jury recommends it. Second, it was also designed to further
New York's longstanding policy against state-sanctioned suicide.
Turning to the second prong of the Becker test, as explained in the
preceding section, the New York statute as written clearly serves both
of the aforementioned legitimate goals.42 So, once again, the Becker
test requires a further examination of possible statutory alternatives to
see whether the actual statutory scheme is truly "necessary" to the
pursuit of those goals.
Such an examination would reveal that the particular alternative
suggested in Jackson, of having a jury decide the defendant's
punishment regardless of how guilt was determined, would accomplish
the first statutory goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which
the jury recommends it. The alternative of universal jury sentencing,
however, would not achieve the second goal of preventing state-
sanctioned suicide-assuming that this goal is interpreted broadly to
represent a legislative desire to prevent a defendant from taking any
substantial step in the direction of his own execution.426 This is
because, when a defendant enters a guilty plea while death remains a
possible sentence in the case, he relieves the prosecution of the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he is death-eligible
in the first place. This is especially true under the New York death-
penalty statute, where aggravating circumstances are established at
the guilt-innocence phase of the two-part trial.427 By pleading guilty to
a capital crime, therefore, the defendant would relieve the prosecutor
of the burden of establishing the very aggravating factors that the
prosecutor would later use to convince the penalty-phase jury that it
should sentence the defendant to death. Although it would still be up
to the jury to determine whether or not actually to impose the death
penalty, by pleading guilty the defendant would have taken a
substantial step in the direction of his own execution, and thus, the
Jackson solution of universal jury sentencing would not fulfill the
legitimate goal (broadly interpreted) of preventing state-sanctioned
suicide.
One example of an alternative system that would simultaneously
achieve both of the goals of the New York statute would be one that
flatly bans all guilty pleas in potential death-penalty cases, whether or
424. See supra text accompanying note 400.
425. See supra text accompanying note 401.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 403-05 for a discussion of the two possible
interpretations of this particular goal.
427. See supra notes 169-82 and accompanying text (describing the bifurcated
scheme created by the 1995 New York statute).
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not the death penalty is actually being sought by the prosecutor. In
Jackson, however, the Court rejected the suggestion of such a system
as having a "cruel impact" on defendants who would prefer not to
contest their guilt.418 It is therefore difficult to see that alternative
system as being not merely viable, but constitutionally compelled.
The only remaining alternative system is the one actually adopted
by Hynes-namely, the prohibition of guilty pleas to first-degree
murder while a death notice is pending.429 This system would fulfill the
first goal of the New York statute, because the death penalty would be
imposed only by a jury's decision. It would also fulfill the second goal,
even if that goal is broadly interpreted, because the defendant could
not take a substantial step toward state-sanctioned suicide. But this
alternative system-like the actual system that prevailed in New York
before Hynes-still encourages the waiver of constitutional rights. This
is because, under Hynes, defendants facing the death penalty are still
allowed to plead guilty to second-degree murder. 3 In other words,
the alternative system adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in
Hynes does not avoid the very same problem of "burdening" the
exercise of constitutional rights that the Hynes Court identified in the
New York statutory scheme.
The Hynes Court felt obligated to approve such guilty pleas to
second-degree murder, even in the face of a pending death notice,
because it concluded that they had been approved by the Supreme
Court in Alford.431 If the Supreme Court were to revisit and reaffirm
Jackson, however, and if it were further to hold that Alford was
merely a case about the voluntariness of guilty pleas and not a
limitation on Jackson, then the Hynes Court's approach-prohibiting
guilty pleas to first-degree murder with a pending death notice, while
permitting such pleas to second-degree murder-would be called into
question. Both alternatives encourage defendants to plead guilty, so
neither alternative can provide a basis for concluding that the other
one involves "needless" encouragement.4n
428. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 584 ("Quite apart from the cruel impact of [a ban on
all guilty pleas] upon those defendants who would greatly prefer not to contest their
guilt, it is clear-as even the Government recognizes-that the automatic rejection of
all guilty pleas 'would rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility."').
429. Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 629-30, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1209, 684
N.Y.S.2d 177, 185 (1998), cert denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
430. Id.
431. If the Hynes Court had reached a different conclusion about Alford, and had
therefore banned all guilty pleas (to first-degree and second-degree murder) while a
death notice is pending, such a rule probably would not have run afoul of Jackson's
reference to the "cruel impact" of a ban on all guilty pleas. See inifra note 437.
432. This creates the following anomaly: The "broader" or "more expansive"
reading of Jackson (described in this section) makes it less likely that the New York
statute is unconstitutional, whereas the "narrower" or "less expansive" reading of
Jackson (described in the preceding section) makes the New York statute more likely
to be unconstitutional. This is odd, but true. It is because the "broader" reading of
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In conclusion, under this view of Jackson, it is at least arguable that,
because New York's statutory plea-bargaining system serves two
legitimate purposes, and because the particular characteristics of that
system are necessary to implement both of those purposes (since no
alternative system would serve the same two goals without likewise
encouraging guilty pleas), any encouragement of guilty pleas
incidental to the operation of the New York statute is not "needless,"
and therefore the statute would be constitutional. In any event, if the
Supreme Court were to revisit Jackson and hold that it prohibits all
statutes that impose "needless burdens" on constitutional rights, then
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Hynes certainly
would need to be revisited.
E. All Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death Should be Prohibited
The fifth and final approach to Jackson would involve a far-
reaching decision by the Court that Jackson, but not Brady, Alford, or
Corbitt, represents the most appropriate judicial response to the
recurring problem of plea bargaining in the shadow of death. Under
this view, and despite what the Court may have said in the post-
Jackson plea-bargaining cases, the Court might hold that a capital
defendant lacks the true mutuality of advantage necessary to engage
in a free-wheeling choice between pleading guilty and going to trial, as
contemplated by Corbitt, even with the assistance of able defense
counsel at his side.433 In other words, traditional plea bargaining in
capital cases can never involve the kind of "give-and-take"
negotiation between parties of relatively equal bargaining power that
Justice Brennan asserted as the backstop to save capital-case plea
bargaining in Brady and Parker. The capital defendant's "choice," in
reality, may be no more meaningful than the Hobson's Choice that
had been offered to the defendant in Fay v. Noia.4 4
Jackson would interpret both the pre-Hynes version of the New York statute and the
post-Hynes version as burdening the defendant's waiver of constitutional rights.
Thus, under the "broader" reading of Jackson, neither version of the New York
statute involves "needless encouragement," because both versions are equally (or at
least comparably) bad. Whereas, under the "narrower" reading of Jackson (i.e.,
reading Jackson as limited by Alford to situations involving "two different penalties
for the same crime"), the post-Hynes version of the New York statute passes
constitutional muster, thus the pre-Hynes version involves "needless" encouragement.
433. Recently, a New York trial judge refused to grant a joint request from the
prosecutor and defendant in a capital case to find good cause to extend the 120-day
period within which the prosecutor could decide whether to elect to pursue the death
penalty in the case, see supra note 172, stating: "District Attorneys throughout the
state have such power regarding charging, plea availability, and withdrawal of a notice
of intent to seek the death penalty even after a jury's guilty verdict that the court does
not feel compelled to find good cause despite the defense consent." People v. Miller,
No. 1969/2000, slip op. at 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 2, 2000); see also supra text
accompanying note 416.
434. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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Perhaps, at the time Brady and Parker were decided in 1970, or
when Alford was decided in 1971, the Court's illusion of equal
bargaining power between prosecutors and capital defendants could
plausibly be maintained-after all, there had been no actual
executions in the United States for many years. Even Corbitt, in 1978,
was handed down at a time when executions remained extremely rare
events. Today, however, with an ever-increasing headcount that has
now reached nearly one hundred executions per year,43 the risk of
death must seem far more authentic and terrifying to those charged
with a capital crime. The previously-cited empirical evidence from
New York suggests the substantial impact that this fear has on capital
defendants, causing many of them willingly to trade their
constitutional rights for a sentence of life without parole."
Under this view, Jackson was merely the Court's first small step in
the enlightened direction of constitutionally prohibiting all plea
bargaining in the shadow of death. The Court may have temporarily
decided to move in a different direction when it upheld the guilty
pleas in Brady and Alford, and when it upheld the New Jersey statute
in Corbitt, but those decisions were misguided. If the Court today
were to revisit Jackson, it might finally acknowledge the underlying
truth that plea bargaining can never be truly equal-and hence cannot
be constitutionally valid-so long as the defendant faces the real
possibility of a death sentence. If the Court were to so hold, then the
Edwards court would be vindicated, because it essentially anticipated
the Court's next move.3 7
It is very likely that this approach to Jackson would not only
prohibit plea bargaining in capital cases, but also lead, in the end, to
more radical restrictions on prosecutorial discretion to seek the death
penalty. This is because, as a practical matter, prohibiting plea
bargaining in capital cases would prove meaningless if prosecutors
remained free to negotiate with defendants prior to the filing of
435. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Number of Persons
Executed in the United States, 1930-2000, at httpz/iAww.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjsI
glance/exe.txt (last visited Mar. 27,2001).
436. See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
437. As noted previously, Edwards did not fully implement the rule suggested by
its reasoning, in that it apparently left open the possibility that a defendant might
agree to plead guilty to second-degree murder even while a death notice is pending on
a charge of first-degree murder. Such a plea had been explicitly upheld in Hynes,
based on the Hynes Court's interpretation of Alford. See supra note 309 and
accompanying text.
Interestingly, if Hynes had interpreted Alford differently, and had therefore banned
all guilty pleas while a death notice is pending-including both pleas to first-degree
murder and pleas to the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder-such a rule
probably would not have run afoul of Jackson's reference to the -cruel impact" of a
ban on all guilty pleas. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968). This is
because there can be no such "cruel impact" if the only limitation is on a defendant's
ability to plead guilty in a case in which the prosecution is still seeking his execution.
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capital charges in a potentially capital case.438 Numerous studies have
shown that the incentives for plea bargaining, among all of the
primary actors in the criminal justice system, are strong enough that
almost all efforts to prohibit the practice have failed; prosecutors,
defense counsel, defendants, and trial courts simply find alternative
ways to achieve the same ends. 439 Thus, a prohibition of plea
bargaining in cases that are already designated as capital cases would
likely serve only to produce a shift to similar plea discussions prior to
the point in time when the cases are so designated. The only truly
effective way to respond to such a shift would be to regulate the
decision to designate a case as a capital case in the first instance-that
is, to regulate prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty.
While this kind of regulation has been suggested by some
commentators,440 courts and legislatures have generally been reluctant
to intrude into the traditional realm of prosecutorial charging
discretion because of separation-of-powers concerns and the feeling
that judicially enforceable legal standards are unavailable.
CONCLUSION
What does the future hold for plea bargaining in New York capital
cases? Will Edwards ultimately be upheld as a logical extension of
Hynes, ensuring that all capital cases must proceed all the way to jury
trial? Or will Edwards be overturned as inconsistent with Hynes,
thereby allowing prosecutors and capital defendants in New York to
resume the customary "give-and-take" of plea negotiations that may
often spare the defendants' fives, but only in exchange for the
surrender of their constitutional rights? And what about the so-called
Owes/Mower guilty pleas, entered before a notice of intent to seek
death has been filed, but when it still can be filed?
We have not attempted to predict the outcome of the current
controversy in New York over plea bargaining in the shadow of death,
nor have we attempted to predict what the United States Supreme
Court might do with the Jackson issue. The Edwards and Mower
decisions are still under review in the New York courts,"' and we do
438. See, e.g., supra Part III.G (discussing the so-called Owes/Mower guilty pleas).
439. See, e.g., Candace McCoy, Determinate Sentencing, Plea Bargaining Bans, and
Hydraulic Discretion in California, 9 Just. Sys. J. 256 (1984); Stephen J. Schulhofer &
Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline
Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1284
(1997). Note that this is a plausible explanation for the aforementioned behavior of
prosecutors, defense counsel, defendants, and trial courts in New York capital cases
after the Hynes decision, and even after Edwards, in Owes and Mower.
440. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 717 (1996); F. Thomas Schornhorst, Preliminary Screening of
Prosecutorial Access to Death Qualified Juries: A Missing Constitutional Link, 62 Ind.
L.J. 295 (1987).
441. People v. Edwards, 274 A.D.2d 754, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d Dep't 2000), leave to
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not intend to express any opinions about the proper resolution of the
issues presented therein, under either federal constitutional law or
state law. Our goal is more modest. We have simply provided what
we hope will be useful background information, together with
descriptions and brief analyses of five plausible approaches that the
Supreme Court could take today if it were to attempt to reconcile
Jackson with its post-Jackson decisions related to plea bargaining and
the death penalty.
Edwards and Hynes, and the many other New York cases that have
attempted to apply them, amply demonstrate the importance of the
Supreme Court's revisiting both Jackson and the post-Jackson
decisions. The confusion and uncertainty currently plaguing the
administration of the death penalty in New York is a direct byproduct
of the Court's failure to make sense out of Jackson. The
jurisprudential tension created by Jackson and the post-Jackson
decisions is palpable and hampers the ability of the New York courts
to achieve both doctrinal and practical stability in this important area
of the law.
In the end, it seems likely that the Supreme Court itself will have to
fix the problem it has created. Sooner or later, the Court will need to
explain whether Jackson has been effectively overruled, has been
limited by Corbitt, survives intact as an ongoing manifestation of
Griffin, or should be extended to prohibit all plea bargaining in the
shadow of death. Until the Court finally chooses one of these
alternatives, or finds another, the rest of us will simply have to keep
guessing.
appeal granted, 2000 N.Y. LEXIS 4238, at *1 (Dec. 27, 2000); People v. Mower, 719
N.Y.S.2d 780 (3d Dep't 2001), leave to appeal granted, - N.Y.2d - (Apr. 9,
2001).
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APPENDIX: FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CASES
IN NEW YORK STATE - 1995-2000
Total First-degree Murder Cases Concluded Between Sept. 1, 1995
and August 23, 2000 in New York State
1. Total cases where notice of intent was filed: 36
A. Notice of intent remained in effect at time of case disposition: 32
1. Cases resulting in agreed life without parole sentences: 14
a. Guilty plea to first-degree murder prior to trial: 12
b. Sentencing agreement to life without parole after trial: 2
2. Cases resulting in guilty pleas with parole-eligible sentences: 6
a. First-degree murder: 3
b. Lesser charges: 3
3. Cases proceeding to capital trial through sentencing phase: 12
a. Jury verdict of death sentence: 6
b. Jury verdict of life without parole sentence: 6
B. Notice of intent withdrawn before trial: 4
I. Cases proceeding to non-capital trial: 3
a. Guilty verdict and sentence of life without parole: 2
b. Complete acquittal: 1
2. Case abated by defendant's death prior to trial: I
It. Total cases where no notice of intent ever filed: 176
A. Cases resolved by guilty plea: 64
1. Sentence of life without parole: 6
2. Parole-eligible sentences: 58
B. Cases proceeding to non-capital trial: 103
I. Cases concluded with sentence of life without parole: 46
2. Parole-eligible sentences: 45
3. Complete acquittals: 12
C. Other dispositions: 9
1. Dismissals: 6
2. Plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or I
defect:
3. Cases abated by defendant's death prior to trial: 2
The New York State Unified Court System Office of Court Administration provided the raw data from which this
table was created.
